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reparations programs through two central questions. First, are truth commissions an effective way to 
achieve justice after periods of conflict marked by mass or systemic human rights abuses by the 
government or guerilla groups? Second, do truth commissions provide a pathway to material reparations 
programs for victims of these abuses? It will outline the conceptual basis behind truth commissions, 
material reparations, and transitional justice. It will then engage in case studies and a comparative 
analysis of truth commissions and material reparations programs in four countries: Argentina, Chile, 
Guatemala, and Peru. From the case studies and analysis, I will argue that truth commissions are an 
effective way to achieve comprehensive justice because they are victim-centered mechanisms that create 
a legitimate basis from which governments can build prosecutions and reparations programs. Next, I will 
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programs and that truth commissions and reparations programs reinforce each other’s effectiveness. 
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This paper seeks to gauge the effectiveness of truth commissions and their links to 
creating material reparations programs through two central questions. First, are truth 
commissions an effective way to achieve justice after periods of conflict marked by mass or 
systemic human rights abuses by the government or guerilla groups? Second, do truth 
commissions provide a pathway to material reparations programs for victims of these abuses? It 
will outline the conceptual basis behind truth commissions, material reparations, and transitional 
justice. It will then engage in case studies and a comparative analysis of truth commissions and 
material reparations programs in four countries: Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, and Peru. From 
the case studies and analysis, I will argue that truth commissions are an effective way to achieve 
comprehensive justice because they are victim-centered mechanisms that create a legitimate 
basis from which governments can build prosecutions and reparations programs. Next, I will 
argue that truth commissions provide a more favorable political condition for the creation of 
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Truth commissions have become an important tool in helping governments investigate, 
document, and overcome past human rights abuses, especially after mass or systemic human 
rights abuses. The most well-known truth commission has been South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of 1995, where South Africans were widely held to have traded legal 
justice for truth – full statements to the commission earned those that gave them amnesty for the 
human rights abuses to which they confessed. The Commission documented the human rights 
abuses committed by both the apartheid government and resistance groups and published a set of 
recommendations and reparations programs. However, South Africa was not a pioneer in the use 
of truth commissions. They have been in operation for nearly 50 years since Uganda’s first 
commission in 1974, and Bolivia and Argentina’s commissions in 1982 and 1983, respectively. 
From these beginnings, there have since been over 40 truth commissions around the 
world, growing in popularity with governments in countries emerging from conflict marked by 
mass or systemic abuses and among those involved in international conflict resolution. They 
have arisen as an alternative or complementary tool to the prosecution of perpetrators, as truth 
commissions approach the question of justice from a victim-centered approach. Truth 
commissions fit into the broader category of transitional justice, judicial and non-judicial 
strategies of addressing past systemic human rights abuses at the hands of a government or non-
state group. Recent scholarship has begun to catalog truth commissions and engage in large-scale 
quantitative and qualitative comparative studies to gauge their effectiveness, building from early 
descriptive scholarship of individual cases.  
While punitive reparations began becoming mainstream international legal tools in the 
early 1900s, especially after World War I, domestic and international reparations for victims of 
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human rights abuses became more widely supported in the decades after World War II. These 
reparations pay compensation or restitution to victims as an acknowledgment of the gross human 
rights abuses committed against them. Reparations do not achieve full justice for victims, but 
they have a unique ability to directly impact the lives of victims. From their inception, truth 
commissions often issue recommendations for reparations programs in their final reports, and 
these recommendations have varying degrees of implementation and success. This link between 
truth commissions and reparations programs presents interesting questions that have not been 
fully answered. 
This paper will seek to gauge the effectiveness of truth commissions and their links to 
creating material reparations programs. It will ask two central questions. First, are truth 
commissions an effective way to achieve justice after periods of conflict marked by mass or 
systemic human rights abuses by the government or guerilla groups? Second, do truth 
commissions provide a pathway to material reparations programs for victims of these abuses?  
The first section of this paper will explore the conceptual basis of truth commissions and 
transitional justice. The second section will explore the conceptual basis of at reparations and 
connect this to practical reparations programs. The third section will conduct case studies of truth 
commissions in Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, and Peru and the material reparations programs 
that followed. The fourth section will engage in a comparative analysis of the case studies. 
Finally, the fifth section will draw conclusions from the concepts and case studies to advocate for 






SECTION I: TRUTH COMMISSIONS 
Truth Commissions: Definition and Theory 
While truth commissions have varied widely in their mandates, designs, and reports, it is 
important to define the parameters of truth commissions to be able to compare specific cases and 
differentiate these commissions from other mechanisms of governmental investigation. Priscilla 
Hayner defines a truth commission as follows: 
A truth commission (1) is focused on past, rather than ongoing events; (2) 
investigates a pattern of events that took place over a period of time; (3) engages 
directly and broadly with the affected population, gathering information on their 
experiences; (4) is a temporary body, with the aim of concluding with a final 
report; and (5) is officially authorized or empowered by the state under review.1 
 
This paper will use this broad definition of truth commissions because while commissions over 
time have varied in their mandates, designs, and outcomes, a broad definition allows one to 
identify common features and unique factors that can create successful outcomes.  
Seeking justice after human rights abuses traditionally focuses on criminal prosecutions, 
which hold perpetrators responsible and seek justice for victims by punishing these perpetrators. 
While criminal prosecutions are the most powerful and important step in seeking justice, they 
alone cannot address the comprehensive needs of a society after emerging from conflict. From 
their inception, prosecutions in post-conflict contexts may have very limited information and 
data to begin from – many mass or systemic abuses are conducted clandestinely, either without 
any records or with records that are inaccessible to judicial systems because the regime still 
holds power. For abuses committed by guerilla groups, records may be more mare. Estimates 
about the total scale of conflict and abuses made by civil society and international organizations 
 
1 Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions, 2nd ed. 
(New York: Routledge, 2011), 1. 
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may be inaccurate due to the lack of access to these primary sources and records. Moreover, 
because they focus on individual cases, prosecutions are usually unable to seek broader, systemic 
information about human rights abuses and their victims. Legal rules about the gathering and 
permissibility of evidence for criminal trials may limit the events and actions investigated and 
the information that is revealed to the public. Placing the burden of proof in a criminal 
prosecution as beyond a reasonable doubt means that conviction rates may be especially low, 
specifically in cases of crimes of clandestine disappearances and murders of victims, where the 
clear documentation and physical evidence to back up prosecutorial claims is often rare. This 
failure to convict may leave victims and societies feeling that comprehensive justice has not been 
achieved.  
Critics of truth commissions assert that prosecutions are still the best option compared to 
second-best truth commissions because of the strict accountability and deterrence that 
prosecutions can bring.2 However, using these mechanisms is not a binary decision. The victim-
centered focus of truth commissions is unique compared to perpetrator-focused prosecutions and 
can fill in some of the conceptual and political voids that prosecutions cannot. Often, truth 
commissions serve as fact-finding bodies where a baseline of information has not been 
established or is not accurate. They can determine the scale and scope of abuse in ways that 
individual prosecutions cannot and can provide information for future prosecutions. Politically, 
the challenge of dealing with those who committed past human rights abuses and those who 
suffered is compounded because the abusers negotiated their departure from power and may still 
hold significant power and influence or may have granted themselves amnesty from prosecution. 
 
2 Eric. Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies: The Impact on Human Rights and 
Democracy (London: Routledge, 2010), 5. 
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While the concept of reconciliation from truth commissions may be imprinted on the 
international memory, stemming from South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, it is 
important to note that truth commissions are not necessarily meant to create reconciliation, 
though they can create conditions for reconciliation and healing. As defined, truth commissions 
are tasked with investigating and documenting abuses. Recommending reconciliation measures 
may be mandated from the inception of a truth commission and its findings may be used to 
launch reconciliation programs and policies. By focusing on giving an official platform to the 
stories of the victims of human rights abuses and memorializing their words through recordings 
or reports, truth commissions can build individual and collective memories of abuses.3 
Ultimately, in a post-conflict society, reconciliation is highly dependent on the context of the 
country and what reconciliation means for political leaders and the public.  
The concept of reconciliation is a deeply subjective topic, often stemming from religious 
notions. This paper will not focus on truth commissions and their ability to promote 
reconciliation because reconciliation is not the same as justice for victims of mass abuses, which 
should be the focus when examining the use of commissions. It would be unreasonable to expect 
victims to reconcile with the perpetrators of abuse. The narrative of reconciliation must not be 
used as a tool to distract from the important task of achieving justice for victims and society 
through mechanisms such as prosecutions, truth commissions, and reparations programs. When 
analyzing truth commissions, one must understand that they are necessarily political – a battle 




3 Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 4 
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Commissioners and the staff constantly make choices when they define such basic 
objectives as truth, reconciliation, justice, memory, reparation, and recognition, 
and decide how these objectives should be met and whose needs should be met. 
Inevitably, there will be winners and losers in a truth commission process.4  
 
Due to the political nature of truth commissions, they cannot be analyzed in isolation as legal 
mechanisms, but rather as political bodies in the broader political contexts they exist in. They 
may also be subversive – while new political leaders may sanction the creation of truth 
commissions to legitimate their governance and give the country a mechanism to achieve justice, 
the commission’s findings may not only taint the image of the previous regime, but also the 
image of those who are currently in power. This possibility can have significant effects on the 
implementation and reception of a truth commission’s work. 
Table 1 is a compiled list of all truth commissions that have occurred, providing a 






















4 Onur Bakiner, Truth Commissions: Memory, Power, and Legitimacy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2016), 3. 
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Table 1: List of All Truth Commissions 5 
 
Country Dates of Operation 
1. Uganda 1 1974 
2. Bolivia  1982-1984 
3. Argentina  1983–1984 
4. Uruguay  1985 
5. Zimbabwe  1985 
6. Philippines 1986–1987  
7. Uganda 2 1986–1995 
8. Chile 1 1990–1991 
9. Nepal 1990–1991  
10. Chad 1991–1992 
11. El Salvador 1992–1993 
12. Germany 1992–1998 
13. Sri Lanka 1994–1997 
14. Haiti 1995–1996 
15. South Africa 1995–2002 
16. Ecuador 1 1996–1997 
17. Guatemala 1997–1999 
18. Nigeria 1999–2002 
19. Uruguay 2 2000–2003 
20. South Korea 1 2000–2004 
21. Panama 2001–2002 
22. Peru 2001–2003 
23. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/Serbia and 
Montenegro  
2001–2003 
24. Ghana 2002–2004 
25. Sierra Leone  2002–2004 
26. Timor-Leste 2002–2005 
27. Chile 2 2003-2005  
28. Democratic Republic of the Congo 2004-2006 
29. Morocco  2004–2006 
30. Paraguay 2004–2008 
31. Indonesia and Timor-Leste 2005–2008 
32.  South Korea 2 2005-2010 
33. Liberia  2006-2009 
34. Ecuador 2 2008–2010 
 
5 Operating from Patricia Hayner’s definition of truth commissions stated above, the following chart categorizes all 
truth commissions identified by scholars, to date. This chart includes a compilation of all commissions listed by: 
Bakiner, Truth Commissions, 27-29; Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, xi; and “Truth Commission Digital Collection,” 
United States Institute of Peace, 2011, https://www.usip.org/publications/2011/03/truth-commission-digital-
collection. The exact number of truth commissions to date is not of utmost importance for this paper. Rather an idea 
of the scale of proliferation, time periods, and regions where truth commissions have been implemented will inform 
my analysis. 
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35. Mauritius  2009-2011 
36. Solomon Islands  2009-2012 
37. Togo 2009-2013 
38. Kenya  2009-2013 
39. Canada 2009-2015 
40. Honduras 2010-2011 
41. Thailand 2010-2012  
42. Brazil 2011-2014 






















Truth Commissions and Transitional Justice 
Truth commissions fall into the broader category of transitional justice – a variety of 
mechanisms used after a political transition to address wrongdoings of the previous regime, 
including mass or systemic human rights abuses. The modern transitional justice toolkit includes 
punishing perpetrators through prosecutions, establishing truth commissions, implementing 
reparations programs, purging bureaucracies or security forces of abusers, promoting 
reconciliation measures, and reforming institutions, but can include many other mechanisms and 
institutions.6  
I will first outline a few conceptual mechanisms that are useful when analyzing 
transitional justice institutions and I will place truth commissions and reparations programs into 
this broader conceptual framework.  
John Elster categorizes transitional justice into three institutional forms – legal justice, 
political justice, and administrative justice – with legal and political justice forming two sides of 
a continuum.7 Pure political justice occurs when the executive branch of the government 
unilaterally identifies wrongdoers and decides their fate without the presence of juridical 
standards for evidence or appeal.8 Examples of this include sending officials into exile, summary 
executions, or show trials with preordained outcomes. On the other end of this spectrum, pure 
legal justice is characterized by four aspects: unambiguous laws, an insulated and independent 
judiciary, unbiased judges and jurors interpreting the law, and the presence of due process.9 
Striving towards pure legal justice is a key foundation for transitional justice tools. Finally, 
 
6 Hayner, 8-10. 
7 Jon Elster, Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), 84. 
8 Elster, 84. 
9 Elster, 86-88. 
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administrative justice includes purges in public administration and lies somewhere along the 
political-legal spectrum based on the ability of those purged to appeal to legal entities.10  
Elster also identifies levels of transitional justice: supranational institutions, nation-states, 
corporate actors, and individuals.11 Supranational institutions include international tribunals, 
such as the International War Crimes Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia and the 
Nuremberg Trials after World War II, which are generally considered exogenous because they 
were created by international bodies. Nation-state level transitional justice institutions refer to 
generally endogenous institutions initiated by actors within the country where said justice 
measures are implemented. Corporate actors may be targeted either as dispensers of justice or as 
targets of justice mechanisms and can include political groups, religious organizations, or private 
companies.12 Individual or private justice mechanisms are carried out without the purview or 
sanction of the political or legal system, such as extrajudicial killings or social ostracism.  
Ruti Teitel proposes a three-phase genealogy of transitional justice that is helpful to 
situate different phases of the subject and its manifestations. Teitel traces the origins of modern 
transitional justice, Phase I, to the post-World War II phase beginning in 1945 with the 
Nuremberg Trials.13 This phase generally fits into Elster’s conception of supranational 
transitional justice, which Teitel argues is a unique and triumphant phase of transnational 
collaboration in transitional justice given the unique political conditions of the postwar world.14 
Teitel associates the beginning of Phase II of transitional justice with the weakening and ultimate 
collapse of the Soviet Union and mass democratization trends, beginning in the late 1970s with 
 
10 Elster, 92. 
11 Elster, 95. 
12 Elster, 94. 
13 Ruti G. Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 15 (2013: 69–94), 70. 
14 Teitel, 70. 
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the withdrawal of support for guerilla forces in Latin America, facilitating the end of military 
rule in the region.15 These transitions were followed by regime transitions in Eastern Europe, 
Africa, and Central America, fueled by the Soviet collapse and the end of the Cold War.16 These 
transitions were mostly endogenous political transitions focused around the nation-state level of 
Elster's classification. Phase III of Teitel’s genealogy begins at the end of the twentieth century 
and is associated with globalization and transitional justice mechanisms becoming the standard 
means to approach transition.17 Notably, this phase returns to the international approaches 
identified in Phase I, involving mechanisms that are both supranational and nation-state focused. 
These categorizations help refine the focus of this paper. Under Elster's categorization of 
political, legal, and administrative justice, truth commissions fall on the spectrum of political and 
legal justice, often closer to the legal justice end of the spectrum, though this does vary. Truth 
commissions, through their actions or the use of information from their reports, can also act as 
tools of administrative justice. Similarly, the use of reparations falls somewhere on the political 
and legal justice spectrum, often landing closer to the political justice side, again varying based 
on different cases. Neither of these tools of transitional justice encompasses either pure political 
justice or pure legal justice, and analyses of specific cases can paint a better picture of where to 
situate these institutions along Elster's spectrum. Elster’s levels of transitional justice are also 
important. This paper will mostly focus on truth commissions and reparations from a nation-state 
level, and the result of these nation-state mechanisms often affect corporate and individual 
actions. It will also address the role of supranational institutions as current international 
organizations are encouraging the implementation of transitional justice measures. 
 
15 Teitel, 71. 
16 Teitel, 71. 
17 Teitel, 71-72. 
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Teitel's genealogy of transitional justice, specifically Phase II and Phase III, will 
encompass the four country case studies of this paper. Phase II encompasses the proliferation of 
truth commissions beginning with the earliest truth commission in Uganda (1974), and the 
increased use of commissions in Bolivia (1982-1984), Argentina (1983-1984), Uruguay (1985), 
Zimbabwe (1985), Uganda (1986-1995), Chile (1990-1991), and more.18 These commissions 
largely focus on nation-state institutions including truth commissions and reparations. Phase III 
provides the opportunity to apply nation-state approaches from Phase II, combined with revived 





























18 Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, xi. 
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SECTION II: REPARATIONS 
A Theory of Reparations 
 In international law, transitional justice, and philosophy, reparations have numerous 
meanings. Pablo de Greiff puts reparations in two categories: juridical reparations and 
reparations programs. Juridical reparations programs under international law can include 
restitution (reestablishing the victim’s original job, property, citizenship, etc.), compensation (for 
economic, physical, mental, moral injuries), rehabilitation (social, media, psychological, legal), 
and satisfaction and guarantees of nonrecurrence (a broad category that can include apologies, 
exhumations, sanctioning perpetrators, etc.).19 While these juridical reparations can manifest in a 
variety of ways, reparations programs refer concretely to large-scale reparative measures to 
provide benefits to victims of specific crimes.20 Reparations programs can deliver symbolic or 
material reparations through individual or collective means.21 Symbolic individual reparations 
can include personal letters of apologies, copies of truth commissions, or the proper burial of 
victims, while symbolic collective reparations can include public acts of apology, 
commemorative days, or establishing museums, monuments, and public places in honor of 
victims.22 Material individual reparations can include individual grants or payments, while 
material collective reparations can include medical, educational, and housing service packages.23 
This paper will focus its analysis of reparations on this second, more narrow category of 
reparations – reparations programs and not juridical reparations. Furthermore, it will specifically 
focus on material reparations programs, not symbolic reparations programs. Material reparations 
 
19 Pablo de Greiff, “Justice and Reparations,” in The Handbook of Reparations, ed. Pablo de Greiff (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006, 451–77), 453. 
20 de Greiff, 453. 
21 de Greiff, 453. 
22 de Greiff, 468. 
23 de Greiff, 468-469. 
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programs are unique because they directly benefit victims of abuses through both depth and 
breadth. While trials focus on punishing the perpetrator, reparations programs focus on directly 
and materially addressing the needs of victims, filling the gap in other victim-centered justice 
measures, such as truth commissions. This is because reparations programs individually address 
every victim, while truth commissions may focus on examining larger-scale systems and 
practices, and individual interviews during the truth process often cannot cover every single 
victim. Additionally, reparations programs operate at a mass scale, addressing systemic abuses 
committed against victims – the reach of which cannot be matched by adding singular trials 
together.  
Ernesto Verdeja asserts that reparations programs achieve the following goals:  
[Reparations] publicly reassert victims' moral worth and dignity; make a society 
reconsider its notion of the 'we' when faced with reintegrating as equals those who 
were violated, injured, and marginalized in the past; foster the development of 
public trust in state institutions (important where the state is a primary violator of 
rights); contribute to undermining the justificatory narratives given by 
perpetrators by resituating victims as moral agents; and generate a public, critical 
interpretation of history, a careful reappraisal that moves away from monumental 
and unreflective understandings of the past.24 
 
 If the goal of reparations programs is to center victims in the justice process, then 
evidence of victim preferences is crucial, and these preferences support reparations programs. In 
a survey of Nepali victims who suffered abuses during the 1996 to 2006 civil war between the 
Kingdom and the Communist Party of Nepal, 90% wanted the prosecutions of perpetrators who 
committed crimes such as torture, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings.25 Notably, 54% of 
victims indicated that they felt compensation for crimes, material reparations, was more 
 
24 Ernesto Verdeja, “Reparations in Democratic Transitions,” Res Publica 12, no. 2 (2006: 115–36), 135. 
25 Simon Robins, “Nepali Voices: Perceptions of Truth, Justice, Reconciliation, Reparations and the Transition in 
Nepal,” Journal of Human Rights Practice 1, no. 2 (2009: 320–31), 321. 
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important than trials.26 When asked about their immediate needs, 24% of victims chose 
compensation, 17% chose education, 12% chose basic needs, 8% chose employment, 7% chose 
finding the disappeared, and 3% chose punishing perpetrators.27 This data lends weight to the 
importance of reparations programs for victims of abuses, for whom monetary reparations may 
achieve a type of justice and closure that trials cannot. As will be demonstrated by the case 
studies, many of those disproportionately impacted by conflict are poor, and often macro-level 
institutions such as trials or truth commissions have no material impact on their livelihoods, 
which the abuses committed against them deprived them of. 
 Under Elster’s political-legal spectrum of transitional justice institutions, reparations 
programs are not pure legal justice because they necessarily satisfy aspects of political justice. 
De Greiff notes that legal systems operate fundamentally from the position that breaking the law 
is an exceptional circumstance that has to be punished through trials.28 However, mass 
reparations programs address systemic abuses committed against significant portions of the 
population, where widespread violations were the norm, not the exception. The systemic nature 
of reparations programs also allows them to address political questions beyond individual 
compensation, using collective reparations as a tool to address systemic political concerns, 






26 Robins, 324. 
27 Robins, 325. 
28 de Greiff, “Justice and Reparations”, 454. 
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Practical Reparations 
 While reparations should conceptually and from a victim's point of view, be prioritized in 
a project of transitional justice, there are significant impediments to the realization of reparations 
programs. As reparations programs are carried out on behalf of victims, who as a group do not 
generally have significant political power, the political will to implement reparations programs is 
often low.29 Financing these programs is hard as well. For new political leaders coming out of a 
transition process, it may be more appealing to invest funds into policies and development 
projects that are future-looking, rather than reparations programs, which seem more rectificatory 
and focused on the past. Though not implementing reparations programs may seem politically 
smart to politicians, victims are left feeling that nothing has been done for them, creating future 
opportunities for the reignition of conflict. 
 Growing support from victims, civil society, and international organizations means that 
reparations programs are becoming more common in countries around the world. Internationally, 
various United Nations treaties have enshrined the right to reparations in international law, 
particularly through the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, which was adopted in 2005. International human 
rights courts have ruled in favor of reparations for human rights abuses. Many countries around 
the world have created reparations programs for various abuses, including illegal internment, 




29 Lars Waldorf, “Anticipating the Past: Transitional Justice and Socio-Economic Wrongs,” Social and Legal 
Studies 21, no. 2 (2012: 171–86), 177. 
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SECTION III: CASE STUDIES 
Methodology 
This paper will engage in case studies of truth commissions and material reparations 
programs in four countries, Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, and Peru, examining their political 
contexts, operational characteristics, final reports, broader impacts, and material reparations 
programs. These case studies will form the basis of the conclusions in the following sections in 
examining the degree to which truth commissions can provide the basis for substantive material 
reparations programs. Most truth commissions have been concentrated in Latin America and 
Africa. Given the 43 truth commissions listed in Table 1, 72.09% have occurred in Latin 
America and Africa (31 commissions). 37.21% of commissions have occurred in Latin America 
(16 commissions) and 34.88% of commissions have occurred in Africa (15 commissions). 
Scholarship about truth commissions also follows these broad trends, as substantial amounts of 
academic scholarship has built up around specifically analyzing Latin American and African 
truth commissions, and many present-day commissions take lessons from Latin American and 
African designs. 
I will narrow the geographic focus of the case studies to truth commissions and material 
reparations programs in Latin America, specifically in Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, and Peru. 
These cases provide variation in the nature of the conflict before transition, the design of truth 
commissions, the material reparations programs implemented, and the relative wealth of each 
nation. Though two truth commissions have occurred in Chile, each investigating different types 
of crimes, they both investigated the same conflict and period, and therefore will be studied 
together. The nature of the conflicts in Argentina and Chile can be characterized as class 
conflicts, while the nature of the conflicts in Peru and Guatemala can be characterized as ethnic 
 23 
conflicts. This variation in the nature of conflict can inform if truth commissions and material 
reparations programs operate differently given class or ethnic conflicts and how a country’s 
wealth impacts the scale of material reparations programs.  
Truth commissions in other parts of the world, particularly Africa, have been extremely 
influential in the design and impact of commissions, and a comprehensive study should 
incorporate geographic diversity into its analysis. However, for the scope of this paper, focusing 
on an area that has many early truth commissions and a concentrated number of commissions, 
Latin America, will produce focused conclusions that can be examined on a global scale. 
Additionally, the existence of material reparations programs in each of these four countries after 
the commissions can inform the links between commissions and material reparations programs. 
While the first truth commission was held in Uganda in 1974, it investigated the 
wrongdoings of the same government that had created it and was still in power, and its finished 
report was never published by the President. The next truth commission in Bolivia in 1983 
suffered from a similar lack of political support and resources, and was disbanded before it could 
complete or publish its findings. Therefore, Argentina’s truth commission in 1984 was the first 
commission that completed and published its report. Consequently, it has been highly influential 
in studies of truth commissions. The Argentine and Bolivian truth commissions catalyzed the use 
of truth commissions in countries across Latin America, and their use would then spread around 
the world.  
The four countries covered by the case studies were tasked with investigating abuses 
committed before democratization movements swept through Latin America. Placing them 
within the frameworks of Elster and Teitel brings out the broader trends of these commissions. 
Under Teitel’s genealogy of transitional justice, the case studies are mostly situated within Phase 
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II, though they also straddle the transition into Phase III of transitional justice in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, where international collaboration began to influence truth commissions and 
reparations programs. This transition into Phase II will be clear especially in the case study of 
Guatemala. Under Elster’s levels of transitional justice, these commissions were nation-state 
level investigations focused on establishing abuses carried out by both the state and guerilla 
groups, identifying legal and political processes that facilitated these abuses, and estimating the 
scale and demographics of the people victimized. Given that these cases fit together into the 
same frameworks established by Teitel and Elster, in terms of phase and level of transitional 
justice, they provide a baseline of similarity to begin analyses.  
While the commissions and their reports in the case studies were all conducted and 
written in Spanish, the sources used in this paper will be limited to English language sources. 
This obstacle means that I will not get as much nuance and detail into the administrative records 
and minutes of commissions, court records, and new laws passed, as much of this information 
has not been translated into English. English language scholars who engage in individual or 
comparative case studies of truth commissions in Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, and Peru through 
Spanish use records to inform a more nuanced picture of the deliberative processes and legal 
implementation of truth commissions and their impacts, and the findings from these scholars will 
be used to least partly account for the obstacle. 
This type of administrative information would be especially important if one were 
analyzing the specific design of various mechanisms of truth commissions and the ideological 
and intellectual priorities of commissioners. However, the lack of this type of information does 
not detract as much from an analysis of the more general effectiveness of truth commissions in 
these countries and their ability to deliver material reparations programs. Given the questions 
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that this paper asks and the existence of substantial English language scholarship on these truth 
commissions and translations of commission final reports, laws, and other Spanish language 
scholarship, this obstacle can be overcome. 
The sequence of case studies will be Argentina, Chile (both the first and second truth 
commissions), Guatemala, and Peru. The case studies will follow a “chronological” order based 
on the date of the commissions, except for the second Chilean commission, which will be 
analyzed together with the first Chilean commission. As established earlier, the second Chilean 
commission investigated the same conflict as the first commission but focused on victims who 
were not killed by the regime and can therefore be analyzed through a single case study of Chile. 
This “chronological” order of analysis also means that the first two case studies, Argentina and 
Chile, will be focused on conflicts that are characterized by class, while the second two case 
studies, Guatemala and Peru, are characterized by ethnic conflict.  
Each case study will detail the specific material reparations programs in each country, but 
Table 2 below provides an overview of the total amounts of money, in United States dollars, paid 






















Amount of Material 
Reparations Paid 




Argentina 1983-1984 1976-1983 Over $3 billion paid to over 
16,000 victims or families 
of victims of those 
disappeared/killed 
 
Additional $66 million for 
minors who were victims30 
.036%  
Chile I 1990-1991 1973-1990 $16 million per year for 
4,886 families of victims– 
about $460 million since 
1992 inception. 
0.13% impacted 




Chile II 2003-2004 1973-1990 $45 million per year for 
20,000 survivors of torture 
– about $720 million since 
2005 inception 
see above 
Guatemala 1997-1999 1960-1996 Between $50-$100 million 
to about 33,000 individuals. 
0.20 % 
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Argentina: National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons 
Background of Conflict  
Though Argentina's truth commission focused on investigating the period from 1976 to 
1983, Argentines had experienced systemic political violence and human rights abuses beginning 
in 1930. Under the culture of military interventionism in political and civil society and Catholic 
fundamentalism, the use of violence and torture became common tools of punishment and 
repression for the state.32 Instability was a hallmark feature of Argentine politics – between 1928 
and 1983, Argentina had nine elected governments, only two of which served out their terms.33 
Donald Hodges characterized this period of rule as, “waver[ing] between authoritarian or 
exclusionary regimes and populist-corporatist ones, all highly unstable.”34 The one exception in 
this unstable period was the presidency of Juan Perón from 1946 to 1955, known as the Peronist 
decade. Political parties commonly used armed forces to intervene when they lost power. The 
Radical party initiated coups against Perón in 1945 and 1955, and Peronists initiated a coup 
against the Radical government in 1966. 
Perón, who drew populist power from organized labor and the military, won two 
democratic elections in 1946 and 1951 but was forced to flee the country in 1955 after a coalition 
of military generals and Catholic nationalists, concerned about “moral degradation”, Peron’s 
unwavering support for organized labor, authoritarian abuses, and economic stagnation led a 
coup against him. 35 Perón’s staunch support for organized labor groups clashed with the 
economic interests of the military and religious elites who led the coup, signaling the class-based 
 
32 Emilio Crenzel, “Argentina’s National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons: Contributions to 
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35 Hodges, 37. 
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nature of the conflict and instability in Argentina. In 1973, Perón returned to the presidency after 
winning a democratic election, with his wife, Isabel Perón, as his Vice President. When Juan 
Perón died in 1974, Isabel Perón became president but was deposed in 1976 by a military junta. 
The 1976 coup began an era of Argentine history termed the Dirty War, characterized by 
the mainstream emergence of forced disappearances that significantly deviated from the violent 
tactics used by previous regimes. Emilio Crenzel argues that the prominence of forced 
disappearance signaled a desire by the state to silence and exterminate its rivals and critics 
clandestinely.36 Using clandestine detention centers, the regime kidnapped, tortured, and 
disposed of "subversives" with the goal of leaving no evidence of the acts that occurred. The 
regime mainly targeted those who spoke out against the government and those involved in two 
left-wing guerilla groups, the urban Montoneros, and the rural Revolutionary People's Army.37 
Crenzel argues that these clandestine practices were aimed at avoiding the international 
denunciation that other regimes had incurred, specifically Pinochet in Chile.38 Over this period, 
relatives of disappeared victims filed over 5,000 reports to the Argentine Permanent Assembly 
for Human Rights and thousands of other reports to international bodies and human rights 
organizations.39  
In 1982, within days of losing the Malvinas/Falklands War, the junta removed the 
president from office, and among widespread protests about the regime and its human rights 
abuses, signaled the return to democratic elections in 1983.40 In April of 1983, the regime issued 
a document called the Final Document of the Military Junta on the War Against Subversion. It 
 
36 Crenzel, “Argentina’s National Commission”, 174-175. 
37 Michael Newman, Transitional Justice: Contending with the Past (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019), 3. 
38 Crenzel, “Argentina’s National Commission”, 175. 
39 Crenzel, 175. 
40 Crenzel, 175. 
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stated that all of the regime’s actions were legitimate because they were carried out under Isabel 
Perón’s 1975 executive order to the military to “annihilate all subversion.”41 Before the election 
in September 1983, the regime passed the National Pacification Act through its puppet legislative 
advisory committee, where it granted itself amnesty from future prosecution for crimes 
committed during their “antisubversive war.”42  
After Raúl Alfonsín won the 1983 election, he needed to meet the demands of justice that 
formed the basis of his campaign. He pursued a strategy of limited sanctions against the military 
while also attempting to incorporate them into the democratic state.43 He proposed the repeal of 
the amnesty law and ordered seven guerrilla leaders and the members of the first three military 
juntas to be prosecuted.44 Trials of military officials formed a key part of Alfonsín’s strategy, and 
a truth commission would be used to establish public support, the scope of crimes, and the fate of 
victims. 
Human rights groups and activists demanded a bicameral investigation into the regime by 
the Argentine Congress. Fearing that legislators would compete with each other to impose 
harsher punishments on perpetrators, which could create more tension with the military and 
increase the risk of instability, Alfonsín instead decided to create a truth commission, the 
National Commission on the Disappeared (CONADEP).45 CONADEP can be viewed as a 
mediating political tool to balance the demands of human rights groups and the military and 
right-wing politicians in opposition groups.  
 
 
41 Crenzel, 175-176. 
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44 Crenzel, “Argentina’s National Commission”, 177. 
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Truth Commission  
CONADEP was created through a presidential decree on December 15, 1983, and instead 
of drawing influence from the previously failed commissions of Uganda and Bolivia, architects 
of the Commission drew influence from civil society commissions set up by the United States 
Congress to address specific issues.46 CONADEP was given six months to receive reports of 
disappearances and refer these cases to courts, investigate the fate of the disappeared, locate 
kidnapped children, report any activity aimed at destroying evidence, and issue a final report.47 
CONADEP was comprised of thirteen members. Ten members were chosen by Alfonsín “for 
their consistent stance in defense of human rights and their representation of different walks of 
life.”48 Both houses of the Argentine Congress were asked to appoint members, but only the 
lower branch, the Chamber of Deputies, appointed three members to the Commission. Ernesto 
Sábato, a widely known author, was chosen as the chair. While human rights organizations and 
activists wanted a bicameral investigation that could legally compel perpetrators and the military 
to testify and produce justiciable information, the Alfonsín government’s choice to create a truth 
commission instead limited the investigatory power of the body. 
 Many human rights organizations resisted CONADEP, arguing that nothing but a 
bicameral investigatory body could bring justice. However, the Permanent Assembly for Human 
Rights gave all of the complaints it had gathered during the conflict to the Commission, and a 
prominent member of the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights was appointed to lead the 
depositions department of the Commission, where she brought staff members from various 
human rights organizations into the Commission’s work.49 The Commission did not hold public 
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hearings but created local delegations throughout the country to take over 7,000 statements over 
the course of nine months from over 1,500 survivors, families of the disappeared, those involved 
in disappearances, and involuntary witnesses of abuses.50 Additionally, Argentine embassies and 
consulates were opened to accept testimony, and exiles were encouraged to return and testify.51 
The Commission then decided to tour clandestine detention facilities with survivors of 
disappearances where perpetrators often still worked. These tours were well-covered by the 
media and served as a political and investigatory tool for the Commission, which used media 
attention and popular sentiment to gain more access to sites. The Commission compiled site 
investigations with testimony into dossiers that they then passed on to the courts, outlining 
perpetrators, victims, and evidence at specific sites.52 
 As it neared the end of its investigation, members of CONADEP debated on whether to 
send the evidence it had collected to civilian or military courts – the initial mandate had indicated 
it should send evidence to military courts. While Commission members aligned with the 
government stuck to the official policy of referring evidence to military courts, members 
aligned with human rights organizations wanted evidence to be sent to civilian courts to send a 
signal that the military would be accountable to Argentine civilians. Ultimately, the Commission 
decided to send evidence to civilian courts.53 If military courts requested evidence, the 
Commission would only send testimony from victims or the family of victims who consented to 
the information-sharing, demonstrating the substantive role of victims in managing the judicial 
outcomes of the Commission.  
 
 
50 Crenzel, “Argentina’s National Commission”, 181-183; Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 46. 
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Report  
In 1984, after nine months of work, CONADEP issued its final report to the public, 
named Nunca Más (Never Again). It identified 8,960 people who had disappeared and were 
never seen again from its interviews and it listed 365 clandestine torture centers, though it noted 
that the total number of victims was probably in the tens of thousands.54 The prologue of the 
report begins by saying, “During the 1970s, Argentina was torn by terror from both the extreme 
right and the far left.”55 Greg Grandin argues that Alfonsín’s strategy of a truth commission and 
trials was to paint an image of past transgressions to get Argentines to commit to a set of social 
and legal values, staying careful throughout this process to not reach conclusions that were too 
divisive and dangerous. Similarly, Grandin argues that the jurists and scholars who made up 
CONADEP saw their role as, "mediating between dangerously volatile social groups that had 
competing yet equally passionate investments in assigning historical meaning to the term 'dirty 
war'."56 The careful wording of the prologue of the report was meant to mediate between guerilla 
groups and the military and hold both groups accountable for the violence, though further in the 
prologue the report identifies victims as: 
Trade union leaders fighting for better wages; youngsters in student unions, 
journalists who did not support the regime; psychologists and sociologists simply 
for belonging to suspicious professions; young pacifists, nuns and priests who had 
taken the teachings of Christ to shanty areas; the friends of these people, too, and 
the friends of friends.57 
 
The report almost exclusively documents crimes committed by the state against these victims, 
and not many crimes committed by leftist groups. While the rest of the report details these 
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crimes and the victims, the prologue to the report demonstrates the political nature of conveying 
concepts of truth and history and shows how the authors strategized their conclusions. 
The report details repression, outlining the use of abduction, torture, and extermination as 
political weapons and describes the use of clandestine detention centers and coordination with 
other Latin American countries.58 It found that almost 60% of victims were between 21 and 30 
years old, 70% of victims were men, and that children, pregnant women, families, clergy, 
journalists, and trade unionists were specifically targeted to instill fear in others.59 The doctrine 
behind the crimes of the regime was identified as the Doctrine of National Security, which 
sustained totalitarian abuses in service of an ideology of defending the nation from subversive 
leftists who were trying to overthrow the state.60 The last part of the report outlines the 
Commission’s recommendations, including recommending the swift transfer of deposition 
materials to courts, passing laws such as declaring forced abduction a crime against humanity, 
strengthening the power of the courts to investigate human rights abuses, and mandating human 
rights education in all civilian and military educational institutes.61 The final recommendation is 
for a reparations program, which says that the state should ensure that: 
[T]he appropriate laws be passed to provide the children and/or relatives of the 
disappeared with economic assistance, study grants, social security, and 
employment and, at the same time, to authorize measures considered necessary to 
alleviate the many and varied family and social problems caused by the 
disappearances.62 
 
This reparations clause was not expanded further – it did not specify the restrictiveness of 
kinship ties, the degree of economic assistance, or the targeted social and economic programs it 
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recommended. The Commission saw the importance of its work as providing a basis of 
information to operate from and advocated for the impact of its work to be rooted in 
prosecutions, new laws, strengthened legal systems, and education. Given the continued political 
instability in Argentina, Commission members may have not felt that they were the body to 
propose a detailed and systemic reparations program, but rather that their findings and 
recommendations could form the basis for future movements for these programs. 
 Privately, a list of accused perpetrators was sent to the president to use at his discretion 
and the Commission sent 1,086 cases to the judiciary.63 Hayner argues that the information 
collected by the Commission was critical in the trials of members of the juntas, helping to put 
five generals in prison.64 Though instability after the Commission’s work, including threats from 
the military, new amnesty laws, and pardons, slowed the pace of other transitional justice 
mechanisms, by late 2009, over 1,400 people had been charged or were under investigation for 
their role in the Dirty War, and 68 had been convicted.65 
 The report was also published as a shorter book – 150,000 copies were sold in the first 
eight weeks of publication, and it has now sold more than 500,000 copies in numerous 
languages, demonstrating the literary and cultural impact that truth commissions may have.66 
 
Reparations Program  
 After CONADEP issued its final report and before it was dissolved, the president, 
through executive decree, created a new body that would continue compiling information 
gathered by the Commission and present it to the courts. It established the Office of the 
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Undersecretary for Human and Social Rights, which after numerous name and department 
changes, is currently known as the Secretariat of Human and Social Rights. 67 Though the 
Commission issued a recommendation for a reparations program for victims of forced 
disappearances and their families, no program came to fruition in the years following the its 
report because of a variety of factors, including a focus on other objectives, including trials and 
continuing to look for missing people and abducted children. In 1987, a group of human rights 
organizations and jurists came together to form the Initiative Group for the Convention Against 
the Forced Disappearance of Persons to Advocate for an International Convention Against the 
Crime of Forced Disappearances and also begin the process of pursuing a reparations program 
for victims through international law.68 
In Argentina, reparations programs prompted resistance from some human rights groups 
and family members of victims who saw these payments as a type of blood money that was paid 
instead of pursuing justice through prosecutions.69 Reparations payments officially symbolize 
that the disappeared person had died. However, the framework of international law and 
obligations to pay reparations advocated by the Initiative Group provided a sound basis to fight 
for reparations, and all major Argentine human rights organizations supported the creation of a 
reparations program, except for the influential Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo Association, which 
still maintained that reparations payments were blood money from the state. 
 Major reparations programs began under Alfonsín's successor, Carlos Menem, who 
entered office in 1989. Argentina was still reckoning with the Dirty War as Alfonsín began to 
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stop most prosecutions of military officials.70 Menem pursued a strategy of moving forward 
through forgiving past crimes by pardoning both military officials and guerilla leaders and 
beginning to acquiesce to reparations programs.71 
 Reparations programs began during the Alfonsín administration when former political 
prisoners brought and lost cases in Argentine courts which sought compensation for their time in 
prison, which were mostly rejected based on statutes of limitation.72 These prisoners then 
brought their cases to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, an organ of the 
Organization of American States.73 As these cases began to be tried and won by victims in this 
international court, Carlos Menem came to power and decided to accommodate the demands of 
these prisoners. As a former political prisoner of the regime, Menem wanted to implement a 
policy that could redress people like him and earn the respect of the Organization of American 
States by implementing its mediated solution of creating a reparations program.74 
 In 1991, a reparations program was agreed upon. For each day of detention, a victim 
would be paid the highest equivalent salary of an Argentine government employee, $74. This 
works out to $26,400 per year and the maximum payment would be $220,000.75 The period 
encompassed by this program began with Isabel Perón’s 1975 declaration to eliminate 
subversion to the end of junta rule in 1984. The program was then expanded to those who were 
forced into exile, with the same payment structure.76 Victims could use evidence or testimony in 
the CONADEP report as proof to seek reparations.77 
 
70 Guembe, 27. 
71 Acuña, “Transitional Justice in Argentina and Chile”, 214-215. 
72 Guembe, “Economic Reparations”, 29. 
73 Guembe, 29. 
74 Guembe, 29-30. 
75 Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 170. 
76 Hayner, 170. 
77 Guembe, “Economic Reparations”, 32. 
 37 
Then, in 1994, ten years after CONADEP’s final report, the Argentine Congress passed a 
law that created an economic reparations program for victims and families of victims of forced 
disappearances and killings.78 Hayner argues that not only was this program implemented in 
recognition of the injustice of providing reparations for those who were jailed but not to the 
family of the disappeared, but was also a response to national and international court cases where 
families of the disappeared began to win monetary settlements for moral damages.79 This law 
provoked more debate and resistance than the previous reparations programs. People were 
concerned that the state was paying off families instead of pursuing justice against perpetrators 
and that it would have to label disappeared people as legally dead.80 The state made clear that 
reparations did not satisfy other forms of justice, and importantly, created a new legal status, 
“absence by forced disappearance” in 1994. This status “forces the State to accept that the person 
was illegally kidnapped by its agents and that he or she never appeared again, dead or alive.” 81 
While in the past, families would refuse to claim their relative as dead on principle, making 
processes of inheritance, benefits, and lawsuits almost impossible, this new legal definition 
created a classification that allowed families to pursue other forms of legal justice.  
Under this reparations program for the family of victims of forced disappearances, 
families were entitled to a single lump sum of $220,000, paid in government bonds.82 If a family 
brought a case to the Secretariat of Human and Social Rights that was among the 8,960 cases in 
the CONADEP report, they could easily claim the reparations payment.83 If a case was not 
included in the 1984 report, a family would need to corroborate its claim through a previous 
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report submitted to another human rights body, mention in the press, or other legal proceedings 
that tried to establish the whereabouts of the disappeared person.84 In 2004, another reparations 
law was passed that provided victimized children who were born in prison and taken to other 
families a payment of between $25,000 and $50,000 and has paid out around $66 million.85 
Through the administration of Argentina’s reparations program, CONADEP’s successor, 
the Secretariat of Human and Social Rights, has been able to contribute a fuller picture of 
political violence in Argentina. While CONADEP focused specifically on forced disappearances, 
cases and evidence brought to the Secretariat for other forms of political violence to claim 
reparations, such as unjust detention and exile, have painted a fuller picture of a regime whose 
abuses were characterized by their clandestine nature. Through reparations programs for political 
prisoners, those forced into exile, and the families of victims of forced disappearance, the 
Argentine state has paid out more than $3 billion in reparations payments to more than 16,000 
people.86 
 In Argentina, the truth commissions and material reparations programs reinforced each 
other. CONADEP’s work documenting the nature of conflict, identifying victims and 
perpetrators, and providing courts evidence for prosecution helped catalyze other tools of 
transitional justice. The numerous reparations programs implemented helped to collect more 
evidence to inform the nature of all political violence in Argentina, strengthening historical 
understandings of the conflict. The reparations programs used CONADEP’s findings as an 
important legal reference point and the campaign to create the new legal classification of 
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“absence by forced disappearance” would not be possible without a detailed and large-scale 









































Chile: National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation/National Commission on 
Political Imprisonment and Torture 
Background of Conflict 
While Chilean politics from the 1930s to 1970s has been characterized by a higher degree 
of stability than many of its neighbors in Latin America, there have been two key turbulent eras 
that have transformed the political system. First, in 1891, a civil war broke out over opposing 
agrarian and mining interests and conflicts between the executive and legislative branches. The 
Congress, which was supported by the navy, defeated the President, who was supported by the 
army. The Congress changed Chile's political system from a presidential system into a 
parliamentary system.87 After the victory for the Conservatives in the civil war, foreign 
companies were given a considerable scope of autonomy to invest and operate copper and nitrate 
mines. This export-driven mining began to create the class stratifications that would define 
Chilean politics and conflict in the next decades. Peasants occupied the bottom of the social 
structure and operated under an agrarian peonage system, called the patron-peón system, which 
began under Spanish colonialism.88 The working classes in mines and cities began to grow in 
size, political influence, and militancy as they demonstrated and fought for labor rights, 
organizing through the Radical Party, then the Socialist Workers’ Party, founded in 1912, which 
would become the Communist Party.89 A large middle class emerged and organized through the 
Democratic Party, and new business and industrial elites acquired money and power through the 
export-driven mining economy. This tripartite system of political organization that emerged – the 
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socialist and communist aligned working-class, liberal middle class, and conservative elites 
would form the basis for future conflict.  
Second, Arturo Alessandri won the presidency in 1920 during an economic downturn and 
an increase in working-class militancy as a representative of middle-class interests, challenging 
the traditional power of elites in Chilean politics.90 The weak presidency meant that Alessandri’s 
desires to implement social reforms were blocked by the conservative legislature, so in 1924, he 
proposed a new constitution to restore the power of the presidency by bringing in military 
support.91 Though the military partnership gave Alessandri the political power to begin passing 
his reforms, he felt that his independence had been compromised by the military and went into 
exile in September of 1924. This began a turbulent 1920s era of politics in Chile – a military 
junta took over, Alessandri was recalled in 1925 and passed the 1925 Constitution which gave 
the presidency more power, and then resigned later in 1925. Democratically elected Emiliano 
Figueroa Larraín won the presidency in 1925 but was overthrown by Carlos Ibañez in the same 
year, who ruled as a dictator from 1925 to 1927. This instability continued in 1932 when Arturo 
Alessandri won the presidency again and began governing under the 1925 Constitution, ushering 
in an era of stable politics from 1923 to 1973. 
The 1925 Constitution created a strong executive and two-chamber legislature that was 
elected through proportional representation. Importantly for future conflict, the strong executive 
gave the president the power to issue executive decrees that would effectively have the force of 
law.92 The use of proportional representation maintained the important tripartite political 
divisions between Chileans into Left, Center, and Right, meaning that coalition politics were 
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essential and that presidents were often elected with a plurality of votes. Through most of the 
20th century, the Left, Center, and Right consistently polled around one-third of the popular vote, 
and the class-based nature of these divisions became entrenched.  
After decades of a stable political system and Left, Center, and Right parties competing 
for political power, Salvador Allende’s 1970 election to the presidency would upset this stability. 
Allende, a Marxist and member of the Socialist Party of Chile, was the candidate of Popular 
Unity (UP), a coalition of leftist parties whose stated goal was the peaceful transition of Chile 
into a socialist state.93 Allende campaigned to use constitutional processes to transform Chile 
into a socialist state through land expropriation and redistribution and the nationalization of key 
sectors of the economy.94 Two parties in the UP, the Communist Party and Socialist Party, 
formed its base of support – Communist Party support came from industrial workers and miners 
across the country, while Socialist Party support came from rural and urban lower and middle-
class Chileans.95 Beginning in 1960, members of the Communist Party who felt that it was too 
conservative left and joined guerilla groups committed to armed struggle, the most significant of 
which was called the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR).96 
Allende won 36.2% of the vote, while Jorge Alessandri, a former president and son of 
Arturo Alessandri, running as an independent, won 34.9% of votes, and Radomiro Tomic, a 
Christian Democrat, won 27.8% of the vote. Alessandri represented a traditional conservative 
elite class. Tomic’s Christian Democratic Party (PDC) was defined by a progressive Catholic 
theology and commitment to a communitarian system that sought to find a “third way” between 
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Marxist and laissez-faire capitalist systems and became the main party for middle-class Chileans 
– professionals, students, bureaucrats, and white-collar workers.97  
After winning a plurality of votes, Allende needed Congress to confirm his election, and 
the PDC controlled the key votes that would decide his fate. The PDC decided to support 
Allende’s confirmation if he signed a Statute of Guarantees that would guarantee the rights of all 
political parties, the right to private education, and the non-political nature of the military – 
concepts which fit into Allende’s pledge to transition the country to socialism legally and 
peacefully.98 After signing this statute, Allende ascended into the presidency.  
Allende’s partnership with the PDC quickly broke down – they felt that he was violating 
the Statue of Guarantees through his use of executive decrees, and increasing violence from 
militant leftists created the perception that Allende tolerated violence. Facing the regular use of 
veto powers in Congress from conservatives and Christian Democrats, Allende used the 
aforementioned executive decrees established under the 1925 Constitution to requisition factories 
and push through legislation to begin nationalization. The clash between the executive and 
legislative branches characterized the tensions of 1970 and 1971, but by 1972, these tensions 
spilled out to the general public. This era moved away from the tripartite political split of the past 
and towards polarization between those who supported the UP and those who did not. A key 
event that characterized this polarization was the October 1972 strike, which lasted for more than 
a month. As Allende moved to nationalize trucking in a small province, the National Trucking 
Association, fearful of Allende nationalizing the entire industry, declared a national strike.99 
Small shop owners also began closing across the country to support the truckers and were backed 
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by the conservative National Party and the PDC.100 While the Allende government requisitioned 
strikers’ trucks to transport goods, mobilized their supporters to help in the effort, and 
encouraged workers to take over factories that tried to close during the strike, consumer supplies 
were severely limited.101 This mobilization against the government began with grassroots small 
business owners and white-collar workers and was then supported by political parties, signaling 
an important shift in the nature of polarization in Chile. To end the strike, the government agreed 
that it would not take over small private trucking businesses. This agreement was enforced by the 
military entering Chilean politics – the leaders of the army, navy, and air force entered into 
Allende’s cabinet to guarantee the agreement and the neutrality of the upcoming 1973 
congressional elections.102 
By the 1973 March congressional election, the PDC and conservative national party 
allied together into an opposition coalition named the Democratic Confederation (CODE) to try 
to defeat UP. The UP won 43.5% of the popular vote and gained six seats in the lower Chamber 
of Deputies and two seats in the Senate, while CODE won 56.5% of the popular vote.103 Though 
CODE claimed victory with over 50% of the popular vote, UP’s win signaled their growing base 
of support and meant that President Allende could not be impeached in Congress.  
Without any way to oust Allende from power through constitutional measures, both the 
National Party and Christian Democratic Party committed themselves to overthrowing the 
president through a military coup. By claiming election fraud, blocking UP programs in 
Congress, organizing and supporting protests and strikes from copper miners and bus drivers, 
and partnering with foreign powers, chiefly the United States, the opposition sought to 
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destabilize Chile and create the conditions for the military to intervene.104 The Chilean Supreme 
Court ruled in May of 1973 that Allende had improperly interfered with judicial processes in the 
country, and this charge was reiterated through resolutions in Congress.105 Next, senior army 
leaders forced out the constitutionalist head of the army, General Carlos Prats, whom they 
painted as closely aligned with the UP, given the military joining Allende’s government, and 
replaced him with General Augusto Pinochet.106 In July and August of 1973, the UP, led by 
President Allende, and the PDC, led by Patricio Aylwin, negotiated the UP's plan to socialize 
key sectors of the economy but failed to find agreement as the PDC kept coming back with more 
demands.107 As strikes continued and right-wing groups committed acts of terrorism and 
sabotage, Allende turned to his last alternative and planned to announce a plebiscite on his 
government on September 11, 1973, which he informed General Pinochet about. With tensions 
rising, Allende refused to arm his supporters and stayed committed to the constitutional process 
while the opposition was waiting for the military to intervene and hand power to them.108 
Finally, on September 11, 1973, the day of the planned plebiscite, Allende was alerted to 
a naval rebellion and left for the presidential palace. He initially announced over the radio that 
the navy had rebelled, without any knowledge that any other branches of the military were also a 
part of the coup.109 However, the next radio broadcast by the entire military and police force 
made clear that it was a coup – they demanded that Allende surrender the presidency, and 
Allende’s cabinet members began to be arrested – many were jailed, tortured, or disappeared.110 
During his second, and last radio broadcast, Allende refused to resign from the presidency 
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despite the military guaranteeing a safe flight out of the country if he did. The military began 
bombing Allende’s presidential palace, and Allende was later discovered dead with a self-
inflicted gunshot wound.111 
The junta gave the public a mixed message about its goals during its first public 
broadcast. As the senior commander, Pinochet began by saying that patriotic duty had led the 
junta to save the country from Allende's chaos and that he had no personal ambitions for power – 
instead, the members of the junta would switch off occupying the presidency.112 General Leigh, 
the Air Force Commander, spoke about the military’s decisions to intervene after three years of 
the “Marxist cancer” and its mission to “fight communism… [and] extirpate it, whatever the 
cost.”113 When the director general of the national police spoke, he said that the police joined the 
junta to “return to the path of true legality” and “returning the country to the path of obeying the 
constitution, and the laws of the Republic.”114 
A month later, Pinochet confirmed that the military would not rule for a brief 
transitionary period, but instead would engage in a long battle to “extirpate evil from Chile at the 
root”, echoing the statements of General Leigh.115 While the PDC expected to emerge as the new 
governing party of Chile after the coup, the military junta suspended Congress and made clear 
that the PDC's leader would not lead the junta.116 It gave itself, the four-person junta, supreme 
rule over the nation through the executive and legislative powers, put political parties in 
indefinite recess, banned leftist parties, and installed military officers to most governmental 
posts. The junta declared a state of siege that had been created under the 1925 Constitution, 
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which was renewed until 1978 and gave it the basis to wage its fight against leftists. The courts 
were kept open and acquiesced to the junta – military and police claims were accepted as truth 
and judges were fearful of ruling against the junta. 
Lois Oppenheim argues that the Chilean military had a two-phased project – first, to rid 
the country of leftist political groups and institutions which had fomented class-based 
antagonism in Chile, and next, rebuild economic, political, and cultural institutions along 
capitalist and anti-Marxist lines.117 Declaring a war of extermination and neutralization against 
Marxism and Socialism meant that the regime had declared war against more than 40% of the 
Chilean population that had supported Allende and leftist groups. At the end of 1973, the junta 
created the Directorate for National Intelligence (DINA), its branch of secret police whose 
mission was to interrogate and eliminate leftist leaders and UP supporters from Chile. DINA 
engaged in kidnapping, torture, disappearances, and exiles with a key focus. In the first two years 
of junta rule, DINA targeted MIR, the left-wing paramilitary organization that had previously 
engaged in armed conflict against the state and the military, then in 1976, it targeted members of 
the Socialist Party, and in 1977, it targeted members of the Communist Party.118 DINA also 
worked with landowners and the fascist right-wing paramilitary group, Fatherland and Liberty, to 
target peasants who had sought land reform or engaged in land takeovers.119 Dissidents were 
often forced into exile – kidnapped and let go on the Argentine side of the Andes Mountains or 
forced onto flights out of the country. The scope of state violence was reduced in 1977 after 
DINA, facing American pressure after assassinating a former Allende minister in the United 
States in 1976, was disbanded by Pinochet. He replaced it with the National Center for 
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Information (CNI), which carried out a similar mission. To protect itself from future retribution, 
the junta implemented a law in 1978 that gave the military amnesty for any crimes committed 
from 1973 to 1978 during the aforementioned “state of siege” in Chile.120 
While the junta had planned to rule Chile as a collective body, Pinochet consolidated his 
singular power as the dual leader of the armed forces and the executive.121 By 1974, Pinochet 
had named himself the supreme head of the nation, leader of the junta, and President of Chile.122 
He used DINA to eliminate opponents and potential challenges to his power from both the 
Allende government and his own – he ousted General Leigh from the junta in 1978 after he had 
called for a transition to civilian rule in five years.123 Once he had consolidated power, Pinochet 
wanted a new constitution that would keep himself and the military in power, prohibit any leftist 
groups, and outline a slow transition to civilian rule. In 1980, Pinochet unveiled this new 
Constitution to the public, which included both transitionary and permanent articles. The 
transitionary articles meant that the Constitution would not become permanent until eight years 
after its introduction. These transitionary articles stated that Pinochet would remain president 
until 1989, when the junta would propose a candidate, most likely Pinochet, to be approved 
through a plebiscite.124 The candidate who won would rule for eight more years, until 1997. 
During this transitionary period, there would be no Congress and no political parties – the junta 
would continue making laws until a new Congress in 1990. The permanent articles entrenched 
members of the military into the government by creating a National Security Council that had 
oversight over civilian government, giving the National Security Council the power to install 
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leaders of the branches of the military, establishing a Congress that included nonelected 
members from the military and national police, and banning speech about class struggle.125 
Additionally, the Constitution stated that Pinochet would remain the Commander in Chief of the 
army until 1998 and subsequently would be a senator for life.126 After 30 days of introduction 
and with repressed opposition from the Christian Democratic Party, the new junta announced 
that the Constitution was approved by two-thirds of the public and rejected by 30% under 
suspect electoral conditions.127  
 In 1981, Pinochet took the presidential oath for an eight-year term and faced an economic 
crisis from 1981 to 1982, where laissez-faire economic policy created severe unemployment and 
bankruptcies, creating an opening for democratic opposition to emerge. In 1983, the national 
copper mining union declared a Day of Protest and began to find support among political parties, 
which began a period of protest until 1986.128 Grassroots groups, unions, women, and young 
people began attempting to protest during this period from 1983 to 1986 but were severely 
repressed by Pinochet. Though they were unsuccessful, this signaled growing opposition to the 
regime among working and middle-class Chileans. Political parties began to mobilize to beat 
Pinochet through the constitutional plebiscite scheduled for 1988. If more than half of voters 
voted no in the plebiscite in support of Pinochet, he would be forced to hold a competitive 
presidential election.129 When 55% of voters voted no on the plebiscite, a coalition of sixteen 
parties named the Coalition for Democracy ran Patricio Aylwin, the President of the Christian 
Democratic Party as their candidate, and faced Hernán Büchi, the regime’s candidate, and 
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Francisco Errázuriz, and populist right-wing candidate.130 Aylwin won a majority of votes and 
became Chile’s first democratically-elected leader since 1973. 
 
Truth Commission 1 
 When Aylwin ascended into the presidency in 1990, he faced a tense political situation 
and the constitutional limitations established by the 1980 Constitution – Pinochet remained the 
commander of the armed forces and had made clear that any step too far would result in military 
action. In response to Aylwin’s campaign rhetoric of truth and justice, Pinochet responded, “the 
day they touch any one of my men, the state of law is ended.”131 Additionally, the 1978 amnesty 
law shielded officials from prosecution, and courts were still occupied by judges loyal or afraid 
of the military. In 1990, the Supreme Court rejected a motion that requested the inapplicability of 
the 1978 Amnesty Law against military leaders, cementing the military’s impunity during 
Aylwin’s presidency.132Aylwin decided to proceed cautiously, aware of the politics of an 
unstable democratic transition and the possibility of another military coup, and without feasible 
options to pursue prosecutions.  
 Aylwin established a truth commission, the National Commission on Truth and 
Reconciliation a month into his presidency in April of 1990. The Commission is known as the 
Rettig Commission because of its chair, Raúl Rettig. The Rettig Commission was established 
through presidential decree and was tasked to investigate “disappearances after arrest, 
executions, and torture leading to death committed by government agents or people in their 
service, as well as kidnapping and attempts on the life of persons carried out by private citizens 
 
130 Oppenheim, 140. 
131 Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies, 53. 
132 Acuña, “Transitional Justice in Argentina and Chile”, 226. 
 51 
for political reasons” from the coup on September 11, 1973, to Pinochet's last day in office, 
March 11, 1990.133 Cases that did not result in death were left out of the mandate and therefore 
the scope of the Commission was narrow. The Commission needed: 
a. To establish as complete a picture as possible of those grave events, as well as 
their antecedents and circumstances 
b. To gather evidence that may make it possible to identify the victims by name 
and determine their fate or whereabouts  
c. To recommend such measures of reparation and reinstatement as it regards as 
just; and  
d. To recommend the legal and administrative measure which in its judgment 
should be adopted in order to prevent actions such as those mentioned in this 
article from being committed.134 
 
The Commission’s power was also limited as it could neither subpoena any witnesses nor 
divulge the names of any perpetrators because it was not a judicial body, and instead would refer 
its findings to the courts, which could take legal action.135 It was composed of eight members, 
four of whom had supported Pinochet and four of whom had been in opposition, and was chaired 
by Raúl Rettig, a former liberal senator and ambassador under Allende who represented a non-
threatening form of liberalism.136 It was given nine months, and later a three-month extension, to 
produce a final report and had a staff of 60 people.137 
 Seven of the eight members of the Rettig Commission had law degrees and prioritized a 
legalistic notion of truth that privileged documentary information as evidence over testimony.138 
The Commission relied heavily on the human rights archive of the Vicariate of Solidarity of the 
Catholic Church, which helped document reports of human rights abuses during the regime’s 
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rule.139 The Commission then sought to corroborate evidence from numerous other human rights 
organizations that had gathered information during the conflict, including the Chilean Human 
Rights Commission and Foundation for Social Assistance of the Christian Churches.140 It also 
reached out to military, business, labor, and professional organizations, as well as political 
parties, to submit lists of victims. The national police, military, MIR, Communist Party, and 
other pertinent groups all were asked to provide information. Though many of these groups 
responded, the national police and military evaded answering by declaring that records had been 
destroyed, they did not have information, or that they could not divulge intelligence 
information.141 
 The Commission interviewed victims by publicizing their work and opening government 
offices at the provincial and regional level and consulates and embassies abroad to any person 
who wanted to testify about an individual case.142 Given that the Rettig Commission was not 
judicial, it was not required to divulge the identities of victims or families who testified, which 
was important in a country where Pinochet and his loyalists held considerable power.143  
 Through corroborating documentary information from civil society and government and 
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Truth Commission 1: Report  
 The Rettig Commission issued its 1,800 page report in February of 1991, with President 
Aylwin releasing it to the public on national television, asking for forgiveness from victims and 
asking the military to make amends.145 Aylwin sent the cases to the Supreme Court and urged 
that prosecutions should begin, both ignoring the 1978 amnesty law and focusing on abuses that 
had happened after 1978.146 Pinochet responded that he had a “fundamental disagreement” with 
the report and stressed the necessity of the 1973 coup.147 The report was well circulated through 
prints in newspapers but was not widely printed into books.148 While the report did not release 
the name of perpetrators, the Communist party newspaper, El Siglo, acquired this list and 
published the names of perpetrators.149 
 Of the 3,428 cases submitted to the Commission, it found that of the cases that fell under 
its mandate, 2,115 people had been killed by the state while 164 had been killed by armed 
opposition groups, meaning that 92.8% of victims had been killed by the state while 7.2% of 
victims had been killed by armed opposition groups, which was not solely restricted to leftist 
groups.150 About 4% of killings were attributed to leftist groups.151 Most of the violence carried 
out by the state was under DINA from 1973-1977, when it was tasked with the systematic 
extermination of leftist leaders and supporters.152  
Importantly, the balance of violence meant that the military's central argument – that the 
country suffered a state of siege at the hands of leftist groups and needed to fight a brutal 
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campaign against them, was demonstrably false. However, the report did not directly blame the 
regime for abuses committed, keeping with Aylwin and Rettig’s strategy of trying to create a 
neutral document that would not spark conflict. It said that the military was drawn away from its 
role as a neutral constitutionalist and into the conflict.153 Those on the left criticized the report 
for trying to establish a moral equivalency between the right and the left before and during 1973, 
ignoring Allende’s commitment to constitutionalism and negotiation, and for being “more 
sympathetic to the fears that motivated opposition to Allende in defense of private property than 
those of the ‘extreme left political groups’ that spread an ‘ideology of armed struggle’.”154 
The report recommended a symbolic, legal, and material reparations program as a way 
for the state to assume responsibility for the abuses committed. It recommended symbolic 
reparations in the form of memorials, monuments, a National Human Rights Day, and organizing 
campaigns geared toward reconciliation.155 In terms of legal reparations, it proposed the creation 
of legal status, “arrested and disappeared to be dead”, similar to the forcibly disappeared status in 
Argentina so that families could proceed with the relevant estate and administrative necessities 
for a presumed dead person.156 The report also proposed reparations through social programs for 
families. Finally, a material reparations program was proposed for families of those who were 
killed by the state, and the Commission recommended that lawmakers codify this program into 
law and provided guidances for this codification, chiefly that recipients should be paid no less 
than the monthly average family income in Chile each month in reparations.157 
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 Though the report initially enjoyed support from Congress, in the weeks following the 
release of the report, militant leftists assassinated a close Pinochet confidant and advisor, Senator 
Jaime Guzmán, and discussions about the political impact of the report subsided as the threat of 
militant leftists was raised again.158  
 
Truth Commission 1: Reparations Program 
  When the Rettig Commission finished its work, Congress created a National Corporation 
for Reparation and Reconciliation to continue the Commission’s work and “search for the 
remains of the disappeared, resolve cases still left open, organize the commission’s files so that 
they could be made public, and institute the reparations program.”159 President Aylwin sent 
Congress a draft reparations bill to create a material reparations program for the families of 
victims of abuse, and Law 19.123, passed on February 8, 1992, established a monthly pension 
reparations program for the families of victims included in the Rettig Commission’s report and 
those established by the National Corporation for Reparation and Reconciliation.160 The law 
created an overarching monthly pension value, of which different family members would be 
entitled to certain percentages of this value – in 1996 currency values, this was 226,667 Chilean 
pesos or $537.161 There was no limit to the number of family members who could claim 
reparations under this program, as each victim was not divided into percentages. Rather, the 
overarching pension value provided a point to calculate individual reparations from. Each month, 
the surviving spouse would receive 40% of the total value, the mother (and in her absence, the 
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father) of the victim would receive 30%, the mother or father of a victim’s out-of-wedlock 
children would receive 15%, and each of the children of the victim would receive 15% until they 
reached age 25, unless they were mentally ill, in which case they were entitled to the 15% for the 
rest of their lives.162 Each recipient was also entitled to a lump-sum bonus payment equal to 12 
months of reparations payments.163  
 The initial number of beneficiaries was 5,794 in 1992 and dropped to around 3,200 
beneficiaries in 2001.164 Additionally, the program gave the children of victims full scholarships 
for higher education and a stipend to cover food and supplies while in school until the age of 
35.165 The highest yearly cost of these programs was close to $16 million per year.166 In 2021, 29 
years after the implementation of this reparations program that paid a maximum of $16 million 
per year, the total amount paid would be at most $464 million, though the decreasing number of 
beneficiaries each year means that this total figure is lower in reality. 
 
Truth Commission 2  
 While the Rettig Commission’s report documented cases of human rights abuses, 
political debates about these abuses and forms of remedy other than a truth commission and 
reparations were severely limited while Pinochet remained as commander-in-chief of the army 
until 1998. After he transitioned to become a Senator for life in 1998, Pinochet was arrested in 
London on an extradition request from Spain – Spanish judges had used the Rettig report as part 
of their evidence against Pinochet.167 Chilean and international activists and lawyers had been 
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organizing for Pinochet to be arrested under a principle of universal jurisdiction for human rights 
abuses and succeeded.168 Pinochet was placed under house arrest in London until he was released 
in 2000 on medical grounds, not extradited to Spain, and returned to Chile. This began a legal 
battle in Chile with Pinochet intermittently placed under house arrest under various indictments. 
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of an indictment in 2000, which it then dismissed in 2002 on 
medical grounds, and finally, it overturned this dismissal and ruled in favor of an indictment in 
2004, paving the way for prosecutions against Pinochet. Pinochet died in 2006 before being 
convicted of any crimes, but he had been implicated in more than 300 cases of human rights 
abuses and corruption.169 
 Pinochet’s arrest shifted the political landscape in Chile, where the judiciary was more 
inclined to pursue prosecutions and politicians were more open to accepting the abuses of the 
past regime and reconciling. By 2010, 779 officials had been charged in Chilean courts with 
human rights abuses, over 200 had been tried and convicted, and 59 were serving sentences in 
jail – many of these cases used the Rettig Commission’s records.170 
 From the beginning of the 1990 transition to democracy until the 2000s, victims of 
abuses from the state who had survived had been fighting for their inclusion in the truth process 
and a reparations program. Amid the growing demand for a new commission from human rights 
groups, President Ricardo Lagos established the National Commission on Political Imprisonment 
and Torture in September 2003, which became known as the Valech Commission, named after 
Bishop Sergio Valech, the chair of the Commission. The Commission was tasked with 
determining the victims of political imprisonment who had been detained and tortured by the 
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state between 1973 and 1990 and was mandated to propose a reparations program.171 The Valech 
Commission operated between 2003 and 2005 and operated under a 50-year secrecy law wherein 
any materials shared with the Commission could not be directed to the judiciary for 50 years in 
efforts to maximize the number of victims that would testify.172173 However, victims could 
directly bring their testimony to the judiciary and seek prosecutions. Cath Collins argues that the 
Valech Commission was regressive, under a legalistic view, compared to the Rettig Commission 
in two ways – first, it was more secretive and less publicly accessible, and second, it did not 
connect to judicial mechanisms.174 
 The Valech Commission’s testimony and document collection through government 
office, consulates, and embassies was more popular than expected – deadlines for submissions 
had to be pushed back as the Commission realized that the scale of political imprisonment and 
torture was more widespread than had been estimated.175 By the end of the Commission, it had 
taken more than 35,000 statements. Importantly, the scale of abuses was so immense that the 
Valech Commission reopened again in 2011 to process even more cases.176 
 
Truth Commission 2: Report 
 The Valech Commission’s report was published in 2004, with an additional report 
published in 2005. It identified 28,549 people who had suffered political imprisonment by the 
state.177 The 2011 reopening of the Commission added almost 10,000 people to this number, 
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bringing the total number who had suffered political imprisonment as identified by the 
Commission to almost 40,000 people.  
 The report said that “torture was a policy of the state, meant to repress and terrorize the 
population.” 178 Two-thirds of the reported cases of torture took place in the months following 
the 1973 coup, and 94% of people detained in the months following the coup were tortured.179 Of 
the initial 28,549 victims, 1,244 were younger than 18 at the time of the abuses, and 176 were 
younger than 13.180 The Commission identified fourteen main forms of torture – electric shock 
was the most common, but the state also used, “the setting of dogs on naked female prisoners, 
the torture of children to make their parents talk, or the ‘collateral damage’ of miscarriages 
induced through sustained beating and sexual assault.”181 
 As mandated, the report outlined a system of symbolic, educational and health, and 
material reparations programs.182  
 
Truth Commission 2: Reparations Program  
 In 2005, the Chilean government implemented a reparations program similar to what it 
had done for the families of victims identified by the Rettig Commission. Victims identified by 
the Valech Commission were paid a lifelong monthly pension of about $200 in 2005 prices and 
were entitled to similar health care and educational expense programs as the families of 
victims.183 The maximum yearly cost of this program is about $45 million. In 2021, 16 years 
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after the implementation of this reparations program that paid a maximum of $16 million per 
year, the total amount paid would be at most $720 million, though the decreasing number of 










































Guatemala: Commission for Historical Clarification 
Background of Conflict 
 In 1944, members of the working and middle classes forced right-wing military dictator 
Jorge Ubico, who had ruled since 1931, to resign, ushering in what became known as “ten years 
of spring”, the first period of democratic rule in the country. In his place, Ubico appointed a 
three-member military junta to govern, which was overthrown in October 1944 by a coup 
launched by army officers, among them Jacobo Árbenz, the future president.184 This began the 
Guatemalan Revolution and in 1945, democratic elections for president were held. From 1945 to 
1950 Juan José Arévalo governed as Guatemala’s first democratically elected president, and his 
successor, Jacobo Árbenz was the second democratically elected president from 1951 until he 
was deposed through a coup in 1954. Arévalo and Árbenz were committed to capitalism and 
pursued social and political reforms in a country where power was disproportionately held by 
large landowners and foreign interests, specifically the United States-based United Fruit 
Company, which under Ubico, who was backed by the United States, owned 42% of 
Guatemala’s land.185 Arévalo and Árbenz guaranteed political liberties and democratic elections, 
abolished forced labor which most of Guatemala’s indigenous population was subjected to, and 
instituted social welfare programs and workers’ rights laws that facilitated unionization.186 
 One of the most important policies pursued by Árbenz was agrarian reform, one of his 
main campaign platforms. In 1950, about 2% of people controlled 72% of arable land in 
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Guatemala, 12% of which was being cultivated.187 Notably, indigenous Guatemalans, who made 
up about 54% of the population in the 1950s, more than 90% of whom were Maya, had been 
historically exploited and lived in extreme poverty.188 Árbenz sought to reorient the Guatemalan 
economy towards capitalism by focusing on peasant proprietors. Árbenz’s Agrarian Reform 
Law, passed in 1952, gave the government the power to expropriate non-cultivated land, pay 
landowners in government bonds, and redistribute the land through ownership and leasing 
structures to peasants.189 The law redistributed land to over 100,000 families, and workers and 
peasants organized in support of the program.190 Historians and economists argue over the 
benefits of the agrarian reform law – many argue that it considerably benefitted Mayans, while 
others hold that discriminatory distribution gave most land to Ladinos, people of mixed Hispanic 
and indigenous backgrounds.191 
 Agrarian reform and peasant organization angered large landowners, military elites, and 
the United Fruit Company, who with the help of the United States, orchestrated an 
“anticommunist” coup against Árbenz in 1954, and installed Carlos Castillo Armas into 
power.192 Armas was assassinated in 1957 and after an irregular election in 1958, Miguel 
Ydígoras Fuentes came into power. During this period, many of the reforms from the 1944-1954 
democratic era were rolled back, including the agrarian reform programs of Árbenz.  
 In 1960, after a group of left-wing army officers orchestrated a failed coup against 
Fuentes, they established a guerilla insurgency against the state that would begin the Guatemalan 
civil war, which would last for 36 more years. The 1960s and early 1970s of the conflict between 
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the state and guerillas has been characterized as a “Gentleman’s War”, fought between members 
of urban middle classes and Ladino peasants in the Eastern region of the country. During this 
period, Maya in the rural areas of Guatemala began to organize for local community 
development through partnerships with the Catholic Church and for political reform by taking 
power against local Ladino elites, but Maya did not have a significant presence in local 
politics.193 In the 1970s, insurgency groups, including the Guerilla Army of the Poor (EGP) and 
the Organization of People in Arms (ORPA), began to expand into the Western indigenous 
highlands, and as Mayan peasants continued to suffer from immense economic inequality, they 
were forced to move around the country for seasonal work and to cities to find work, catalyzing 
the formation of a distinct Mayan and indigenous political identity that would form the basis of 
the resistance to the state.194  
 For the government, the possibility of the political uprising of the Maya would threaten 
the basis of Guatemala itself – since its founding, the Maya and other indigenous people had 
been systematically excluded from political or economic power, and their left-wing ideologies 
and popular participation would alter the course of the country. In the late 1970s, the government 
began killing community and peasant leaders, and from 1981 to 1983, engaged in systematic 
massacres of indigenous communities to eliminate the base of support for the insurgency through 
a scorched-earth policy.195 From 1980 to 1981, the guerilla insurgency reached its peak, with 
estimates of 6,000 to 8,000 fighters and 300,000 to 500,000 collaborators across the country, and 
in 1982, groups united together to form the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), 
a coalition of guerilla and leftist groups to fight against the state, including the EGP and 
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ORPA.196 The Maya were identified by the state as a distinct ethnic group that needed to be 
systematically targeted to fight the insurgency.197 Mayan communities were classified according 
to suspected guerilla activity, and violence was committed that corresponded to the level of 
guerilla activity – communities that extensively supported the insurgency were fully 
destroyed.198 The most violent phase of this period was presided over by Efraín Ríos Montt, who 
was in office from March 1982 to August 1983.  
 After Montt’s rule and the declaration of victory against the insurgency, military 
institutions were imposed throughout the countryside, including forced resettlements, the 
militarization of government positions, and mandatory paramilitary defense patrols.199 After 
Montt was overthrown in 1983, the military guided a return to democracy in 1985 by drafting a 
new constitution and instituting elections where only right-wing and centrist parties were 
allowed to run candidates. In 1986, Vinicio Cerezo, the most progressive candidate in the race, 
won the presidency and governed until 1990 in what critics called a “civilian counterinsurgency 
state”, where the military continued committing abuses against insurgents under the guise of 
democracy and civilian rule.200 During the 1980s, civil society groups, Mayan political and 
human rights organizations, and the Catholic Church began to pressure the government to begin 
negotiating for peace with the URNG, and in 1994, the Guatemalan government formally entered 
into peace talks with the URNG, brokered by the United Nations, signing four peace accords that 
year.201 The last of these four peace accords was the Agreement on the Establishment of the 
Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence, which would 
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establish a truth commission named the Historical Clarification Commission to investigate 
crimes from the civil war.202 In December of 1996, the Guatemalan government and URNG 
signed its final peace accord, and the Historical Clarification Commission (CEH) began its work 
in 1997, three years after it was agreed upon. 
 
Truth Commission  
 A truth commission in Guatemala appealed to civil society and victim advocacy groups 
during peace talks, and they lobbied heavily the URNG and government to institute one. 
However, the context of negotiations in Guatemala was distinct compared to Argentina and Chile 
because they started while a civil war was ongoing, rather than a truth commission beginning 
under a newly established democratic government. The 1994 Agreement to establish a 
commission was constrained by these political factors and dictated that “the Commission shall 
not attribute responsibility to any individual in its work, recommendations and report nor shall 
these have any judicial aim or effect” and did not give the Commission subpoena powers.203 
However, this restriction on naming individuals and restricting judicial capacities left the 
Commission’s mandate broad – it was tasked with investigating “the human rights violations and 
acts of violence that have caused the Guatemalan population to suffer, connected with the armed 
conflict” and did not specify a concrete period to investigate, but rather the period from the start 
of the conflict to the end of peace agreements.204 Civil society felt that this agreement was weak 
given the restraints on the Commission, and Hayner notes that these objections, directed toward 
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the URNG, almost derailed the peace process in 1994.205 The Commission was given six months 
to finish its work, with the ability for a six-month extension. The chair would be appointed by 
the United Nations Secretary-General, and the chair would appoint one Guatemalan academic 
and another Guatemalan from any sector as the other chairs.206 Finally, the Commission’s 
recommendations would aim to “preserve the memory of the victims, to foster a culture of 
mutual respect and observance of human rights and to strengthen the democratic process.”207  
The CEH began its work in 1997 with three commissioners. The chair, Christian 
Tomuschat, was a German law professor and United Nations Guatemala expert who was 
appointed by the United Nations Secretary-General.208 The other two commissioners, Edgar 
Alfredo Balsells Tojo, a lawyer, and Otilia Lux de Cotí, a Mayan scholar, were appointed by 
Tomuschat.209 Tomuschat notes that the CEH decided to focus its investigation mainly on 
“attacks on life and personal integrity, in particular extrajudicial executions, forced 
disappearances, and sexual violations… its center of gravity focused on violations of basic 
human rights, where questions of life and death were at issue.”210 
 During its peak phases, the CEH had more than 200 staff members and 14 field offices 
around the country. Only non-Guatemalans directed field offices and departments to show 
neutrality, but Guatemalans worked as staff members on the Commission.211 Interviews were 
conducted in private to protect the identities of victims, many of whom feared reprisal from the 
 
205 Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 32. 
206 Agreement on the Establishment of the Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations and Acts of 
Violence That Have Caused Guatemalan Population to Suffer”, Composition. 
207 Agreement on the Establishment of the Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations and Acts of 
Violence That Have Caused Guatemalan Population to Suffer”, Purposes, III. 
208 Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 33. 
209 Hayner, 33.  
210 Christian Tomuschat, “Clarification Commission in Guatemala,” Human Rights Quarterly 23, no. 2 (2018: 233–
58), 239-240. 
211 Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 33. 
 67 
state if they gave testimony. Paul Seils argues that the investigative portion of the CEH was 
“unparalleled in the history of truth commissions in Latin America” compared to other 
commissions because of its proactive interview structure that went to communities and sought 
out people rather than waiting for people to come to regional offices.212 CEH staff visited more 
than 2,000 communities, conducted over 500 collective testimonies and more than 7,000 
individual testimonies, and estimated that over 20,000 people participated in their investigatory 
process.213 
 In addition to individual and collective interviews, the Commission requested files from 
the Guatemalan military, the United States government, and various civil society and victim 
groups. While the Guatemalan military claimed to have no records of violence during the civil 
war, the Commission successfully requested files thousands of files from the United States 
government to be declassified, which gave them an outline of the Guatemalan military's 
personnel and organization and United States support for various military dictatorships in the 
country.214 Civil society and victim advocacy groups that had collected information during the 
conflict provided the Commission with thousands of cases and background information. The 
Catholic Church’s Recovery of Historical Memory Project and the International Center for 
Human Rights Research, which worked through indigenous organizations throughout the 
country, collected thousands of testimonies that were given to the Commission – these two 
organizations also published their own reports.215 
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 In February 1999, the CEH released its final report. Its investigation documented a total 
of 42,275 victims – 23,671 were victims of arbitrary execution and 6,159 were victims of forced 
disappearance.216 Unlike more legalistic reports of other countries, the CEH report, given its 
constraints, approached the conflict through lenses of history and social sciences to detail a 
broader context within which conflict occurred. The CEH identified the underlying anti-
democratic conditions of conflict rooted in severe economic inequality, structural injustice, and 
racism against Mayans, where elites tried to create an authoritarian racist state that sought to 
exclude the majority of the population and consolidate the power and wealth of elites.217 It stated 
that “the violence was fundamentally directed by the State against the excluded, the poor and 
above all, the Mayan people, as well as against those who fought for justice and greater social 
equality” – 83% of the victims were Mayan and 17% were Ladino.218 Using estimates from its 
database, comprised of its findings and those of other civil society groups, it estimated that more 
than 200,000 people were killed or disappeared.219 93% of the violations documented were 
committed by the state, while 3% were committed by guerilla groups.220 The report found that 
abuses were carried out against civilians:  
Faced with widespread political, socioeconomic, and cultural opposition, the State 
resorted to military operations directed towards the physical annihilation or 
absolute intimidation of this opposition, through a plan of repression carried out 
mainly by the Army and national security forces. On this basis the CEH explains 
why the vast majority of the victims of the acts committed by the State were not 
combatants in guerrilla groups, but civilians.221 
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The Commission documented a total of 669 massacres of defenseless civilian communities – 32 
massacres were committed by guerilla groups and 626 massacres were committed by the state in 
Mayan villages – their people, animals, and agricultural land, were entirely exterminated by the 
military.222 The geographic component of abuses was also important – for example, in the Ixil 
region, 70 to 90% of villages were razed.223 The Commission documented extreme acts of 
cruelty common to state massacres of Mayan communities: 
Acts such as the killing of defenceless children, often by beating them against 
walls or throwing them alive into pits where the corpses of adults were later 
thrown; the amputation of limbs; the impaling of victims; the killing of persons by 
covering them in petrol and burning them alive; the extraction, in the presence of 
others, of the viscera of victims who were still alive; the confinement of people 
who had been mortally tortured, in agony for days; the opening of the wombs of 
pregnant women, and other similarly atrocious acts, were not only acts of extreme 
cruelty against the victims, but morally degraded the perpetrators and those who 
inspired, ordered or tolerated those actions.224  
 
Throughout the report, the CEH traced institutionalized racism against Mayans, their organizing 
and increased political power, and how this created the conditions that targeted them for 
destruction by the state. From these patterns of civilian massacres and specific targeting of 
Mayan people, the Commission determined that the state had committed genocide against the 
Mayan people from 1981 to 1983 through its counterinsurgency operations.225  
In the recommendation section of the report, the CEH recommended measures to 
preserve the memory of victims, ensure human rights compliance, strengthen democratic 
processes, and other measures to promote peace, and proposed a reparations program. The report 
recommended a National Reparations Program for the victims and relatives of victims of human 
rights violations, including a material reparations program for victims, health and social policies, 
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territorially based collective reparations programs, a legal designation for absence due to forced 
disappearance, a program to find disappeared children, and a program to exhume graves.226 The 
report made clear that Mayans should be central in developing the reparations programs most 
important to their communities. The material reparations program proposed by the CEH focuses 
on restoring previous property taken during the conflict and compensating victims or families of 
victims who suffered “the most serious injuries and losses.”227 
After the report’s release, the Guatemalan government released a statement claiming that 
the report’s recommendations had already been implemented during the peace process, but a year 
later, the new president, Alfonso Portillo, committed to implementing the CEH’s 
recommendations.228 Otilia Lux de Cotí, a former commissioner of the CEH, joined Portillo’s 
cabinet, but few of the recommendations proposed by the CEH were implemented. Prosecutions 
were notably absent after the peace process. In 1999, indigenous activist Rigoberta Menchú filed 
a case in Spain to extradite Efraín Ríos Montt, president during the most violent period of the 
conflict that the CEH determined constituted genocide, including the full CEH report as 
evidence.229 In 2006, a Spanish court issued an extradition order, which Guatemala did not 
comply with. In 2012, Ríos Montt was tried in a Guatemalan court and was convicted of 
genocide and crimes against humanity and sentenced to 80 years in prison, though the conviction 
was overturned by the Constitutional Court in 2012, and Ríos Montt died in 2018 while his case 
was being retried.230 As of 2009, only 3 of the 626 massacres documented by CEH had been 
successfully tried in court by 2009.231 
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Reparations Program  
 Though the CEH recommended a reparations program in its report in 1999, a program 
was not created until 2003. In the early 2000s, numerous cases were brought before the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights seeking reparations from the Guatemalan state for human 
rights abuses. One of the most influential of these cases was the 2004 judgment regarding the 
1982 Plan de Sánchez massacre, where government forces massacred a Mayan village of over 
250 people – the Court ruled that almost $8 million in compensation needed to be paid.232 Given 
this context of international rulings about compensation and advocacy from human rights and 
victim groups in Guatemala, the president created the National Program for Reparations (PNR) 
through executive decree in 2003, and as of now, it has been renewed until 2023.233 From 2003 
to 2005, the PNR paid almost no reparations as a reparations policy was being designed.234 In 
2005, after negotiating with victim groups, the PNR instituted a reparations policy with five 
parts: restitution measures to reestablish or compensate for material losses (land, houses, etc.), 
monetary reparations for abuses committed by the state, psychosocial measures, measures to 
dignify victims (memorials, helping to exhume bodies), and cultural restitution measures for 
indigenous people.235 Victims or their families are required to present testimony and 
identification documents and birth certificates, which can be difficult given the state’s historical 
inability to register all Guatemalans, the fact that many land ownership records were destroyed 
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during the civil war, and that the PNR will not help victims who do not speak Spanish work with 
the state to obtain records.236 Guatemala never established a national database for crimes 
committed during the civil war, aside from the CEH’s database and those of civil society 
organizations, so each case is processed individually.  
 The PNR’s monetary reparations program makes a one-time payment for specific crimes 
committed by the state. Families could claim payment, but the single payment would be split 
among the family. 
a) For enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and death resulting from 
internal armed conflict, the state pays 24,000 quetzals, about $3100.  
b) For torture and sexual violence, the state pays 20,000 quetzals, about $2600.  
c) For attempted extrajudicial execution, serious human shield injuries, serious 
injuries from indiscriminate attack, serious mine injuries, serious crossfire 
injuries, serious persecution injuries, and attempted arbitrary execution, the 
state pays 12,000 quetzals, about $1550.237 
 
From 2005 to 2015, the PNR has provided 32,802 reparations payments to victims or their 
families.238 Though no total figure has been established by the Guatemalan government, the total 
number and range of payments suggest that the PNR has paid between about $50 million and 
$100 million between 2005-2015. In 2015, the PNR had more than 38,000 pending applications 
to process, which includes more claims to monetary reparations and other reparations.239 The 
Guatemalan Human Rights Ombudsman has noted that the greatest success of the PNR has been 
its payment of monetary reparations.240 
 The future of the PNR is unclear – due to its history of creation through the executive 
branch, its budget and priorities are dependent on the president. For example, during social-
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democratic President Álvaro Colom’s administration from 2008 to 2012, compensation to 
victims was at its maximum, letters of apology from the state accompanied payments, housing 
reparations programs began, and symbolic apologies for genocide were common.241 However, 
from 2012 to 2015, during President Otto Pérez Molina’s pro-military administration, individual 
compensations decreased, symbolic reparations disappeared, and the PNR instead spent money 
































241 Martínez and Gómez, 28. 
242 Martínez and Gómez, 28. 
 74 
Peru: Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
Background of Conflict 
 After oscillating between democratic elections and coups for previous decades, Fernando 
Belaúnde of the centrist Popular Unity party was democratically elected President in 1963 on a 
revolutionary promise that would impose state intervention to the capitalist economy to correct 
injustices. His presidency was marked by political stalemate – Belaúnde clashed with his own 
party, which did not hold a majority in Congress, and Congress censured many of Belaúnde’s 
cabinets.243 In his first few years in office, Belaúnde tried to pursue agrarian, education, housing, 
and other reform programs, but was largely unsuccessful due to resistance from the APRA-UNO 
coalition in Congress, composed of the left-wing American Popular Revolutionary Alliance 
(APRA) and the right-wing Odriist National Union (UNO).244 In 1968, amidst growing 
frustration against Belaúnde’s presidency and rumors that the military would stage a coup, 
APRA aligned itself with Belaúnde, whom they preferred over a military coup.245 
 Throughout Belaúnde’s presidency, the dispute between the International Petroleum 
Company (IPC) and the Peruvian state about ownership rights of oil and mineral rights was 
constant. Concessions to the American oil company were painted as forms of economic 
imperialism. In September of 1968, Belaúnde’s government came to an agreement with IPC, 
which claimed ownership rights for the Peruvian state but gave substantial and complex 
concessions to the oil company, including millions of dollars in tax forgiveness and ownership of 
lucrative refining processes.246 When the final contract was made public, one of its pages was 
missing and could not be found. These two factors gave credibility to accusations of corruption 
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and fraud, and Popular Unity attempted to dissociate itself from Belaúnde, who then began a 
fight to keep control of his party, while APRA stood behind Belaúnde.247 This event gave the 
military cover to seize power from a president they believed was ineffective in delivering reform 
for Peru. The military, led by Juan Velasco Alvarado, mounted a coup against Belaúnde on 
October 3, 1968, and ousted him from office. 
 From 1978 to 1975, Alvarado ruled as the leader of a radical left-wing military junta that 
characterized itself as neither capitalist nor communist and delivered sweeping reforms to poor 
peasants and working-class people. Alvarado engaged in agrarian reform, committed to 
eliminating all large private estates by 1975 by expropriating land from large landowners and 
redistributing it to peasants. 248 His government nationalized or took large stakes in the financial, 
telecommunications, transportation, oil, and mining industries, and instituted systems of worker 
control in firms.249 Though the junta did not engage in the scope of repression as other right-
wing juntas across Latin America and stated its goal as developing a plural and democratic 
society, it was still a military dictatorship that was not accountable to its people. 
 In 1975, as the economy stagnated and Alvarado was suffering health problems, 
Francisco Morales-Bermúdez, a moderate within Alvarado’s government, launched a coup 
against Alvarado and seized control of the government. Alvarado began to eliminate more left-
wing members of the government, instituted more right-wing economic policies, and committed 
to bringing Peru back to democratic governance in a few years.250 In 1980, Peru returned to 
democratic elections and Fernando Belaúnde was re-elected as President in July.  
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 However, before the election, the Communist Party of Peru – Shining Path (Shining 
Path), a revolutionary Maoist party committed to armed struggle for communism, refused to 
participate in the democratic electoral process and staged acts of violence to destabilize the 
leftists that decided to participate in the electoral process. On the night before election day in 
May of 1980, in the village of Chuschi, in the region of Ayacucho in south-central Peru, a group 
of Shining Path members took ballot boxes and ballots for the elections and burned them in the 
public square – signifying the start of what they called the “people’s war”, the armed conflict 
between the Peruvian state and Shining Path.251 
 This obscure act did not have much influence on the election. Shining Path was founded 
in 1970 by Abimael Guzmán, a philosophy professor, and began with about 51 members, 
confined largely to intellectuals and students in the university.252 In 1980, at the beginning of the 
conflict, Shining Path had about 520 members, concentrated around Ayacucho.253 Shining Path 
claimed to fight for rural peasants in Peru, and expanded its base of support and violence from 
1980 to 1982 in Ayacucho, a rural area with mostly peasants, though many peasants did not 
support the organization. In 1983 and 1984, the democratically elected president tasked the 
military with a counterinsurgency offensive against Shining Path in Ayacucho, which marked 
one of the most violent eras of the conflict.254 As both sides engaged in mass abuses against 
civilians, Shining Path kept control of Ayacucho, appearing as a lesser of two evils to many 
across the country, and began expanding to control Lima, the capital city. By 1989, Shining Path 
had about 10,000 members.255 
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 This war between the state and Shining Path brought a crisis to Peru as it neared the 1990 
presidential election – 32% of the territory and 49% of the population was under military control 
and it was suffering from an economic crisis.256 Alberto Fujimori, a neoliberal candidate of the 
right-wing Cambio 90 political party, won the election. During this era, Shining Path decided to 
increase the intensity of their violence in hopes that the government would engage in further 
violence against peasants, which could build more support for Shining Path. However, in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, the military redirected its methods towards more "selective repression" of 
Shining Path members and worked with peasant communities to create Self-Defense Committees 
that fought back against Shining Path.257 In 1992, violence from Shining Path reached peak 
levels – numerous peasant Self-Defense Committees were massacred by Shining Path, 
community and political leaders were assassinated, terror attacks and bombings were carried out 
in Lima, and more than 100,000 people were displaced.258 
 In April of 1992, Fujimori claimed obstruction from Congress and initiated a self-coup 
where he suspended the Constitution and Congress, dismantled the judiciary, and gave himself 
the power to rule through decree during an emergency.259 As the government prepared for an all-
encompassing war to erupt, the leader of Shining Path, Abimael Guzmán, was caught in 
September of 1992. Violence began to decrease as more members of Shining Path were caught 
and prosecuted, and in 1993, Guzmán began to write letters from prison urging Shining Path to 
engage in peace talks and argued that Fujimori’s 1992 self-coup was justified.260 This marked the 
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end of Shining Path’s influence and violence campaign as they fought for survival – though no 
peace deal was ever reached and Shining Path still exists today. 
 In 1995, Fujimori was reelected to his second term in the presidency and continued ruling 
as an authoritarian – he became more repressive towards dissent, exercised enormous control of 
the military, and engaged in a forced sterilization program of almost 300,000 people.261 In 1999, 
Fujimori announced that he would run for a third term, which was illegal under the Constitution. 
However, in 1996, Fujimori was able to make Congress rule that his second term in 1995 was his 
first under a new Peruvian constitution.262 In 2000, Fujimori was elected to a third term, despite 
numerous allegations of fraud and corruption by using control of the media, electoral boards, 
intimidation, and more.263 As Peruvians began large-scale protests, tapes of Fujimori bribing 
numerous politicians leaked, and in November 2000, he fled to Japan and resigned from the 
presidency.264 
 In July 2001, with civil society pressure, interim president Valentín Paniagua issued an 
executive decree establishing a truth commission.265 
 
Truth Commission  
 The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR) was mandated to investigate 
murders and massacres, forced disappearances, arbitrary executions, torture, inhumane or 
degrading treatment, sexual violence against women, violations of due process, kidnapping and 
hostage-taking, violence against children, and violation of collective rights from 1980 to 2000 
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committed by the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), Shining Path, agents of the 
state, official civilian defense groups (the Self-Defense Committees), and unofficial civilian self-
defense groups.266 The CVR was made of 12 members, all of whom were Peruvian. The 
government collaborated closely with human rights groups to appoint members – the chair, 
Salomón Lerner Febres was the President of the Catholic University of Peru, and additional 
members included social scientists, human rights activists, clergy, a retired general, a former 
Member of Congress in Fujimori’s party.267 There were only two lawyers, unlike many other 
commissions made of a majority of lawyers, only one member spoke Quechua, the most widely 
spoken indigenous language in Peru, and there were no indigenous people appointed to the 
Commission.268 It was given 2 years to complete its work. 
 The CVR was directed to address abuses of “collective rights of the native and Andean 
communities”, refer its cases to the justice system for prosecutions, draft a reparations proposal, 
and recommend future reforms.269 It did not have subpoena power but was the first Latin 
American truth commission to hold public hearings, and held 14 public hearings.270 At its peak, 
the CVR had over 500 staff members and 13 regional offices across the country and collected 
about 17,000 statements, 1,100 of which were taken in prisons.271 It collaborated with human 
rights groups by processing testimony the groups had collected in their archives. 
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The commissioners found that victims wanted foremost for prosecutions of those who 
committed abuses.272 Therefore, the CVR decided to use juridical standards of fact-finding in 
investigations and referred all information to the attorney general. 
 
Report  
 In August 2003, the CVR released its 8-volume, 8,000-page final report. It identified 
18,397 dead or disappeared people and used statistical estimation to estimate that 69,280 people 
had been killed or disappeared during the course of the conflict.273 New testimonies and 
information may place the death toll at more than 100,000 people.274 Indigenous Peruvians, who 
make up only 25% of the population, comprised 75% of the total victims.275 75% of the victims 
were rural, illiterate, poor farmers.276 40% of victims were from Ayacucho, and 12% of victims 
were state authorities, such as mayors, judges, or other officials.277 The CVR report addressed 
gendered and sexual violence as well, finding over 531 cases of sexual violence committed 
against women and men.278 The CVR argued that the indifference that other Peruvians felt 
towards the violence and atrocities as they were committed stemmed from discrimination against 
Peru’s indigenous people, who have historically been marginalized.279 Shining Path was 
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responsible for 54% of the murders and disappearances, while the state was responsible for 
37%.280 The Commission found 4,600 clandestine burial sites across Peru.281  
 The CVR sent 47 specific cases to the attorney general to be prosecuted.282 Though the 
report was signed with unanimity, the retired air force general commissioner added a reservation, 
claiming that the military had carried out their duty and that some facts in the report were not 
fully proven.283 
 The recommendations section of the report contains 85 items – mainly programs for 
political reforms and reparations. At the political level, the report argues that Peru needed a “new 
social contract” that would recognize all Peruvians as first-class citizens. Through consultation 
with victim groups during the drafting process of the report, the CVR and civil society groups 
developed a Comprehensive Reparations Program (PIR) composed of six forms of reparations: 
symbolic reparations, health programs, education programs, restitution of rights, economic 
reparations, and collective reparations.284 Lisa Magarrell, an adviser for the CVR, notes that the 
Commission decided to use the PIR as a program to acknowledge and address the crimes 
committed against individuals by the state, while other recommendations would address the 
structural issues of inequality and racism identified by the report.285 In terms of economic 
reparations, the CVR recommended a lump sum of $10,000 to be distributed to family members 
of victims – 2/5 to widows or partners, 2/5 to all of the children, and 1/5 to the parents of the 
victim, and a pension of about $5,000 to be given to surviving victims.286 
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 In 2004, a human rights court was established, as was recommended by the report, and 
has obtained about 46 convictions of 88 cases tried.287 Most of these cases have focused on 
abuses carried out during Fujimori’s presidency, and not the presidencies of his predecessors. In 
2009, Fujimori was convicted of human rights violations and corruption, and was sentenced to 
25 years in prison. 
 
Reparations Program  
 In early 2004, preliminary steps were taken to implement the PIR, when President 
Alejandro Toledo set up the High Level Multisectoral Commission (CMAN) to follow up on the 
CVR’s report. CMAN was only given a supervisory role, so its impact was limited.288 In early 
2005, a law was passed that created the legal categorization of “absence by reason of 
disappearance” to address forced disappearances during the conflict.289 In late 2005, a full 
version of the PIR was passed by the Peruvian Congress, which was detailed further through a 
2006 presidential decree.290 The law and decree assigned CMAN to coordinate the 
implementation of the PIR, which included both individual and collective reparations programs, 
while the Reparations Council was established to create a single registry of all victims of the 
conflict.291 While the CVR’s report recommended that members of “subversive” groups should 
be eligible to receive reparations by the state for crimes committed against them, the law passed 
by Congress excluded all members of “subversive” organizations who were victimized by the 
state from receiving any reparations.292 
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 The PIR program was based on the CVR recommendation but included a seventh 
reparations program: restitution of civil rights, education, health care, collective reparations, 
symbolic reparations, access to housing, and economic reparations. Those eligible for economic 
reparations were defined through the 2006 Presidential decree as victims who had suffered rape 
or injury that resulted in disability, or families of victims that were murdered or disappeared.293 
Economic reparations payments began in 2011, and CMAN determined that victims should 
receive 10,000 soles, about $2700, while families of victims would split the 10,000 soles.294 
 As of April 2018, the Reparations Council had registered 226,727 people, not all of 
whom were eligible for economic reparations under the program. 141,540 of the registrants were 
victims and 85,187 of the registrants were family members of victims.295 By the end of 2019, the 
Peruvian government had paid out 324,601,932 soles, about $88 million, in economic reparations 
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SECTION IV: CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
Truth Commissions in Comparison 
 The truth commissions in Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, and Peru were created after 
conflicts that had diverse origins, but they all produced reports that influenced the creation of 
material reparations programs for victims who suffered human rights abuses from the state and 
guerilla groups. For country comparisons, I will broadly examine the two Peruvian commissions 
together, as the Valech Commission can be seen as an extension of the Rettig Commission. I will 
compare these truth commissions and the reparations programs that followed through the 
analysis of prosecutions, the context of the emergence of these commissions, the involvement of 
international bodies, the importance of victim, civil society, and religious groups, initial 
mandates during the creation of these truth commissions, commission approaches and 
demographics, final reports, and material reparations programs. 
 
Emergence of Truth Commissions – Political Contexts, Prosecutions, Civil Society 
 In all four countries, prosecutions of the perpetrators of crimes were a central desire for 
victim and civil society groups. However, all four of these countries’ governments and people 
lacked information about the conflict in their country, and its perpetrators and victims.  
Political contexts also constrained the ability to engage in systematic or key prosecutions when 
they were creating their commissions. Due to these factors, judicial systems in each country 
could not function fully and properly as the sole tool to address the decades of conflict and 
violence that had preceded the moment of transition or peace. The bulk of prosecutions occurred 
after these truth commissions issued their reports. These prosecutions that followed commissions 
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used the findings of the reports and the testimony gathered during the commission process, either 
juridically or as background information. 
In Argentina and Chile, commissions emerged after a transition to democracy from right-
wing military dictatorships in the context of highly unstable societies, where fears of future 
military coups and violence committed by state institutions were very credible. While in 
Argentina prosecutions formed a key part of the strategy, amnesty laws passed by the regime 
significantly slowed the pace of prosecutions, and the clandestine nature of the Dirty War meant 
that an investigatory body was necessary to detail the individual and systemic patterns of abuses 
committed during the conflict. The truth commission emerged as a compromise measure 
between a Congressional investigation demanded by civil society groups and the fear from the 
president that opposition interests in Congress could inflame future conflict. In Chile, the 
transition to democracy in the executive branch did not mean that Pinochet was out of power: he 
remained Commander in Chief of the army and his supporters were in the legislative branch, 
shielded from prosecution by amnesty laws. When judicial bodies upheld amnesty laws, 
prosecutions were almost impossible. The Chilean case stands out in comparison to the others: 
the previous regime that had committed the majority of abuses held the most power, so the threat 
of a backlash against prosecutions was palpable.  
In Peru, the commission emerged after a return to democracy after Fujimori fled. It was 
therefore a case of democratic transition, like Argentina and Chile. However, the origins of the 
Peruvian commission differed from these two countries because the conflict still technically 
existed when the commissions began –guerilla groups never officially surrendered but were 
weakened to a point of inconsequentiality. The threat of future violence was not a constraint on 
creating transitional justice mechanisms. The truth commission emerged amid widespread 
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protests and outrage against the increasingly dictatorial Fujimori regime and was created by an 
unelected interim president responding to popular sentiment rather than by a democratically 
elected leader fulfilling their mandate to voters. The scale of the conflict and the balance of 
crimes perpetrated by the state and guerilla groups was not known, so a truth commission could 
provide this information and create a basis for prosecutions.  
In Guatemala, the United Nations-backed peace negotiations to end the civil war did not 
focus on prosecutions, but rather on ending conflict, and the state has failed in many other ways 
to implement the reforms outlined in the final peace agreement. The commission was created by 
the same people who had committed abuses – the government and guerilla groups, which 
explains the opposition of many civil society leaders who felt the commission would not be 
effective. While the commission could not identify individual perpetrators and was given a vague 
but broad task of investigating the causes and effects of the conflict, the commissioners used this 
mandate to look at the historical and systemic nature of the conflict where the confluence of 
ethnic and class oppression against Mayans led to genocide. United Nations involvement in the 
peace process and the truth commission makes the Guatemalan case stand out from the other 
three countries as the other commissions were created internally, without international 
involvement. Other commissions tried to balance the partisanship of commissioners from their 
countries to create credibility, but the Guatemalan truth commission appointed non-Guatemalans 
in key positions. Given the emergence of the Guatemalan truth commission as an agreement 
between two sides of the conflict, mediated by the United Nations, and a commission chair and 
department heads who were not citizens, its findings could in theory hold more credibility and 
legitimacy. 
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Victim groups (including victims and the family of victims), civil society, and religious 
groups in all four countries were crucial driving forces for creating truth commissions, 
contributing to their investigation processes, following through on report recommendations, and 
keeping the government accountable. Notably, for these four countries in Latin America, 
Catholic affiliation rates support the claim about the cultural and political role that institutions of 
the Catholic Church and other religious groups played during conflict, in the truth commission 
process, and in advocating for further measures. In 2014, 71% of Argentines, 64% of Chileans, 
50% of Guatemalans, and 76% of Peruvians identified as Catholic.297 This correlation gave 
religious institutions a powerful cultural and political role in the transitional justice process in 
each country – its approval and participation could legitimate the findings of the commission. In 
Chile and Guatemala, testimonies and databases gathered during the conflict by various religious 
and human rights groups became the starting point for building a database of victims, while in 
Peru, civil society and religious groups were consulted extensively in developing a reparations 
program and other recommendations. More generally, the role of religious organizations in 
transitional justice may differ significantly depending on religious organizations and the 
religiosity of a country’s people. 
 
Truth Commission Design and Reports 
 The initial mandates impacted the trajectory of each truth commission’s work and final 
report. A legalistic mandate in Argentina led to the investigation of cases for prosecution and 
fact-finding. Without a clear mandate for reparations and reform programs, the final report only 
briefly mentioned the need for reparations. In Chile and Peru, investigative mandates also 
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existed, but political support for reparations at the inception of the truth commissions and 
express mandates to propose reparations programs meant that the commissions proposed detailed 
reparations programs that formed the framework of the programs implemented in each country. 
In Guatemala, a broad mandate to investigate the conflict and propose recommendations gave the 
commission broad agency in outlining the historical and political sources of the conflict, 
identifying systemic abuses carried out, and proposing reparations and reforms to transform 
society.  
 The demographics of the commissioners in each country also impacted the way that the 
commissions functioned. In Argentina, Chile, and Guatemala, most of the commissioners were 
lawyers – and many operated investigations and interviews through juridical processes. 
Guatemala’s truth commission is unique in this group given the role of internationally appointed 
commissioners and non-Guatemalan heads of commission departments. The Guatemalan truth 
commission took an approach that was informed by the large numbers of social scientists it 
employed – and used disciplines such as sociology, history, political science, and psychology to 
identify systemic trends, while also focusing on individual cases. In Peru, most commissioners of 
the truth commission were not lawyers, but operated under a detailed mandate. The Peruvian 
truth commission’s report satisfied the mandate but also drew from other disciplines to identify 
the ethnic and class-based discrimination against indigenous people. 
 None of these commissions had subpoena power to summon witnesses or get evidence. 
They relied on voluntary participation from victims, civil society, guerilla groups, government, 
and the military. These cases were characterized by proactive programs of interviewing victims, 
partnerships with civil society and religious groups, and some compliance from governments that 
had initiated the truth commissions. General patterns of noncompliance from the military in all 
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four countries was expected – in Argentina and Chile, which emerged from military 
dictatorships, the military had a vested interest in keeping its crimes secret in order to continue 
staying in power, while in Guatemala and Peru, the militaries that had committed abuses did not 
experience any type of transition or democratic accountability. While none of the commissions 
studied were able to name individual perpetrators, often to appease perpetrators still in power 
and maintain stability, this feature is tempered by the fact that the commissions were not judicial 
bodies that could charge individuals with crimes. However, commissions did build lists of 
individual perpetrators that were forwarded to the government or the judicial system for 
prosecutions, and in the case of Chile, the list of individuals was published in a newspaper, 
probably through a leak by someone in the commission. This pattern demonstrates that even 
strictly prohibiting naming individual perpetrators publicly does not necessarily prevent public 
disclosure. Truth commissions may identify individual perpetrators and pass this information on 
privately, but members of the commission may make a political decision to leak the names of 
individual perpetrators to influence public opinion. 
 The final report of each case demonstrates the political constraints that the commissions 
felt they were operating under and the political choices each truth commission made in writing 
its narrative of conflict. In Argentina and Chile, though the overwhelming majority of abuses 
were committed by the state, the commissions identified the origins of violence as stemming 
from conflict on both sides while carefully blaming the right-wing military juntas, knowing the 
possibility of future violence. These political choices to avoid unequivocally and 
overwhelmingly allocating blame on right-wing regimes give weight to critiques that truth 
commissions can be exploited to keep the same elites in power and not address the economic and 
political disparities between different groups in the country. In Guatemala and Peru, the 
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commissions identified the urgent need to address the historical economic and political 
oppression of indigenous people, who had been disproportionately harmed during the conflicts. 
These two commissions made more direct statements about the perpetrators and the victims of 
conflict.  
 
Material Reparations Programs in Comparison 
 This paper looks specifically at material reparations programs that pay victims and their 
families reparations through monetary payments, which constitute only one part of the broader 
concept of reparations outlined in Section II of the paper. In all four cases, monetary reparations 
programs were combined with other reparations programs, including symbolic reparations, 
health and education services, collective community grants, and new legal classifications. 
Therefore, comparing the monetary payments of reparations programs in the case studies cannot 
provide a full picture of the efficacy of reparations, but can show how countries prioritized 
monetary reparations by the percent of GDP that the reparations would consume and what 
percent of the population would be impacted.  
 Table 3 below calculates two percentage figures as points of comparison between the 
monetary reparations programs in each of the four countries. These figures are useful in 
comparing the countries with each other but are not as helpful in gauging the realistic annual 
economic impact from each program. Because each country’s reparations program took different 
forms, including lump-sum payments or pensions to victims, and payments to families that were 
split or given in fixed amounts, it is difficult to compare the absolute payments given to various 
groups in each country. Rather, the “% of Reparations Payment to Country GDP Year of First 
Reparations Program” column calculates the impact that the total reparations spending of a 
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country had on its GDP the year that the first reparations payment was paid. Governments could 
forecast the costs of the reparations program, so looking at the percent of annual GDP that the 
total program would cost gives a rough idea of how much economic commitment each 
government was willing to give. The “% Total Number of Reparations Beneficiaries to 2019 
Population” column shows how much of the 2019 population of each country was impacted 
through reparations payments, either through payments to victims or their families. 
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While Argentina paid out the most monetary reparations in terms of its GDP, the 
monetary reparations benefitted a much smaller percentage of the population than in other 
countries. The two Chilean commissions and their reparations programs together paid the next 
most in monetary reparations, but the two programs again benefitted a smaller percent of the 
population than in Guatemala or Peru. The Guatemalan and Peruvian reparations programs 
impacted more than six to seven times the percentage of their populations than the Argentine 
program, and around twice the percentage of their populations as the Chilean program, though 
the total impact on GDP was less than in Argentina or Chile. 
Argentina and Chile were and still are the wealthier two countries of the group, with 
GDPs per capita of about $9,900 and $15,000, respectively.300 From 1989 to 2001, Argentina 
had a higher GDP per capita than Chile, and Chile overtook Argentina from 2002 and onwards. 
From the 1990s and on, Peru has been poorer than Argentina and Chile, and Guatemala has been 
the poorest of the four countries. Peru has a GDP per capita of about $6900 while Guatemala has 
a GDP per capita of about $4600.301 These trends in GDP and reparations payments may suggest 
that in poorer countries, the percent of GDP that monetary reparations take may be hindered due 
to the lack of total funds available or because priorities are different. In Guatemala and Peru, 
material reparations payments perhaps did not have as much impact on the material factors of 
victims’ lives, but the broader reach may signal the government acknowledging to indigenous 
people the historical harms that it had caused them, creating an opportunity for these groups to 
take more power in politics. 
 
 
300 GDP trends over time taken from the World Bank, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=AR-PE-GT-CL 




SECTION V: CONCLUSIONS 
 
Ethnic and Class Conflict 
The instances of class and ethnic conflict discussed by the case studies demonstrate how 
truth commissions can be particularly helpful in achieving justice in cases with a dimension of 
ethnic conflict. In Guatemala and Peru, the conflict and its victims demonstrate that ethnic 
conflict is the defining feature, not class. Though ethnicity and class were closely linked, as is 
common in many societies, the lens of ethnicity fully captures the fact that abuses were 
disproportionately committed against specific ethnic groups.  
Truth commissions can more easily remedy the class-based characteristics of conflict 
through general economic policies or laws, as is common in most commission recommendations. 
The impact of ethnic conflict is much harder to remedy. In Guatemala and Peru, the historical 
ethnic and economic discrimination against indigenous people was only intensified by the 
conflict – with genocide against the Maya in Guatemala and the disproportionate murder of 
indigenous people in Peru.  
Truth commissions are particularly helpful in identifying the systemic forms of societal 
and governmental racism and discrimination. They are uniquely positioned to give a mouthpiece 
to historically oppressed groups and influence public opinion about these forms of historical 
systemic discrimination and racism. With this basis of knowledge and narrative of the past, 
countries are more likely to address the root causes of conflict and create conditions for the 





Effectiveness of Truth Commissions 
 The case studies have demonstrated that truth commissions are an effective means of 
achieving justice after mass or systemic abuses. This is not to say that truth commissions are 
perfect tools or that they should be used in all contexts. One must examine mechanisms of 
transitional justice by their abilities to deliver justice to victims and society, address the systemic 
foundations of conflict, and build a more just future. No single mechanism can effectively 
achieve closure of conflict, but individual transitional justice mechanisms each contribute to this 
goal. 
In most cases of conflict, new regimes, victims of abuses, and legal thinkers agree on the 
necessity of prosecuting perpetrators — but prosecutions cannot often deliver comprehensive 
justice in conflicts marked by systemic abuses. This is because prosecutions can be constrained 
in multiple ways. If legitimate information about abuses does not exist, prosecutions cannot 
proceed. In other cases, prosecutions cannot feasibly be the first approach if abusers still retain 
the power to reignite conflict and abuses. If prosecutions do proceed, they may be extremely 
long, which can leave victims and the public feeling unfulfilled by mechanisms of justice years 
after a conflict ends.  
 Truth commissions emerge as a powerful tool to address these barriers to prosecution 
and the comprehensive structures of conflict due to the flexibility in their designs, allowing them 
to adapt to the political circumstances they exist in. Truth commissions can position themselves 
in unstable transitions or peace agreements to mediate between different sides and begin the 
process of studying and documenting the abuses that took place. Their findings can be the 
foundation for justice through other mechanisms, including prosecutions and symbolic and 
material reparations programs. Choices in truth commission design through initial mandates 
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about the scope and role of reparations and recommendations in the final report, the 
demographics of commissioners appointed, subpoena power, private versus public interviews, 
juridical or social science frameworks, and other mechanisms of design can be adapted to fit best 
into the conflict and context of each country. This choice in design, not held back by strict 
juridical standards and procedures, not only allows truth commissions to identify cases of abuses 
for future prosecutions and reparations programs, but also highlight the systematic forms of 
abuses. A truth commission’s final report can give the government legitimacy in pursuing reform 
and prosecution based on the findings and recommendations of the report and gives victim 
groups, civil society, and international organizations a basis from which to push for more 
comprehensive reform and legislation. 
It is impossible to know the counterfactual of using or not using a truth commission after 
conflict. However, the case studies of Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, and Peru have shown that 
their work has left the countries they operated in more peaceful and closer to achieving 
comprehensive justice for victims and society, which is better than inaction. If commissions had 
not been created in these countries, a legitimate source identifying the systemic nature of abuses 
and conflict would not have existed, and the various political and legal reforms, reparations 
programs, and successful prosecutions that came from commission recommendations may not 
have been possible. 
Referring to the conceptual foundations of truth commissions discussed in Section I after 
analyzing the case studies better informs these foundations. Under Elster’s institutional forms of 
transitional justice – administrative, political, and legal justice, the cases have shown that truth 
commissions are a useful tool that can enable the effective use of other political, legal, and 
administrative transitional justice mechanisms. The findings of truth commissions give 
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recommendations and legitimacy to the political and administrative reforms that a government 
wishes to undertake. The documentation of individual cases of abuse and the identification of 
systemic abuses provides the basis for legal justice through both domestic and international 
courts. Under Teitel’s genealogy of transitional justice, future truth commissions will fall into 
Phase III, where transitional justice mechanisms and international collaboration become the 
standard approach to achieving justice after conflict. The cases have shown that involvement 
from the United Nations can build the legitimacy and impact of truth commissions by creating 
commissions and appointing commissioners as neutral investigators. International courts, 
international human rights groups, and other international institutions can work with victims and 
activists domestically to pressure the implementation of the recommendations of truth 
commissions. While there is a risk of international involvement being labeled as an intrusion into 
domestic affairs, previous cases have shown how these bodies are becoming important partners 
in individual countries. 
 
Limitations 
This support for truth commissions must not be made idealistically, and the enthusiasm of 
those advocating for and designing truth commissions must be tempered by a realistic 
understanding of the constraints of their work and impact. A truth commission’s strength lies in 
its ability to adapt to a political context, but it is also constrained by this same political context. 
As demonstrated in the case studies, high degrees of political support from the executive, 
legislative, or the public can lead to truth commissions that are effective in delivering more 
concrete reform or reparations programs. Weak political support, either during a commission’s 
inception or after the release of its report means that even if a commission’s work and report are 
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extremely comprehensive and significant, there is nothing compelling a government to follow 
through with the findings or recommendations. In these cases, however, victim groups, civil 
society, and international organizations have shown their power in using a truth commission’s 
work and report as a basis to pressure governments to implement its recommendations.  
 Truth commissions must be careful in placing blame in their findings. Because they 
often serve as mediating tools between multiple sides, their reports also try to mediate placing 
blame on different sides. Commissioners, aware of these political dynamics, often are careful to 
not fully and directly acknowledge the crimes and abuses of those who are still in power, but this 
tendency can be detrimental for victims and society. Even when conflicts are overwhelmingly 
committed by one side, often the state, the narrative of placing blame on both sides can reinforce 
injustices suffered by victims and hinder the creation of more comprehensive reforms necessary 
to ameliorate the very systemic injustices that led to the pattern of abuse committed against poor 
and marginalized ethnic groups.  
Truth commissions usually cannot document every single victim, abuse, and perpetrator, 
and their tendency to not be given the power to subpoena means that they cannot paint an all-
encompassing picture of what happened, often only collaborating with those willing to 
cooperate. This is an important feature that can often limit the details of a commission’s findings. 
However, other mechanisms such as prosecutions may be able to identify individual details of 
cases but are limited by their ability to identify and address the systemic nature of abuses. 
Establishing a truth commission is also not a zero-sum decision – they can be and have been 





Truth Commissions and Reparations 
The case studies have demonstrated that truth commissions do provide a basis for 
practical material reparations programs. In each of these cases, if a truth commission and its final 
report had not been published, material reparations programs as comprehensive as the ones 
implemented in each country may not have been possible. These commissions identified victims 
and the abuses committed against them, put this information into a database, and proposed 
reparations and other recommendations that often became the framework for reparations laws. 
Without the findings of a truth commission, supporters of reparations programs would not have a 
starting point of information. 
In situations of a lack of political will after a truth commission finishes its work, as 
described above, reparations programs can lose priority with governments. This does not mean 
that truth commissions play any role in directly preventing the implementation of a reparations 
program. A commission’s findings can become the cultural, political, and legal tools that victim 
groups and civil society use to pressure the government to create a reparations program.  
 Truth commissions and reparations programs can provide more comprehensive justice 
together than if each mechanism was used individually. This is because truth commissions and 
reparations programs reinforce the effectiveness and legitimacy of one another. A truth 
commission provides the informational basis to launch a reparations program with lists of 
victims and abuses and estimates of the scale of abuses. A reparations program legitimizes itself 
by using the findings of the truth commissions. As the reparations program registers new cases of 
victims not documented by the commission and begins paying reparations to signal the wrong of 
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abuses carried out against victims, it continues to legitimize the recommendations of the truth 
commission and adds further dimensions to its findings. 
Together, truth commissions and reparations programs achieve unique types of justice for 
victims and society. These two mechanisms deliver victim-centered justice by establishing the 
truth, telling victims’ stories, providing reparations as one type of acknowledgment of abuse 
from the state, and facilitating prosecutions. For a society, the identification of systemic abuses 
and perpetrators of violence helps it understand its history to build a more just future. Though the 
expectations of these two mechanisms must be tempered by reality, one can justifiably be 
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